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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers
Local 614

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. B-90-85

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article XII, Section
4.C(2) when it did not pay employees represented by Local 614 the premium stated therein? If
so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on April 29, 1986
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken;
and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
Article XII, Section 4.C(2) of the collective bargaining
agreement reads:
The Employer agrees to pay two dollars ($2)
additional compensation for each shift, or
any part thereof, when employees are required to work under the conditions defined herein.
(2) Employees engaged in sand blasting or
silica blasting.
More specifically, the issue is whether the use by the
Boilermakers of a pneumatic powered, portable, vacuum "blaster"
to remove slag from welds, is "sand blasting or silica blasting"
within the meaning of the foregoing contract provision.
Though it appears that the use of the "blaster" can be work
that is as "dirty" and unpleasant as traditional sand blasting
performed by the Painter classification, I am unable to conclude
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that it falls contractually within the terms and application of
the foregoing contract clause.
Technically, the "blaster" does not use "sand" or "silica",
so there is some question as to whether it qualifies as "sand or
silica blasting" under the contract terminology.
disqualify it on that ground alone.

But I do not

Significant, I conclude, is

the past practice regarding payment to the Boilermakers for this
work, and the contract negotiations regarding the application of
the "dirty money" payments for its performance.
It is undisputed that the Boilermakers have never been paid
the extra $2 for working with the "blaster;" that the extra $2
has never been paid for the use of that piece of equipment regardless of which classified employees use it; and that the $2 premium
has only been paid to Painters when and while they perform traditional sand blasting using different equipment.

Coupling this

practice with the contract negotiations for the 1984 Agreement
leads to the persuasive conclusion that the parties did not intend to apply the $2 premium to the use of the portable "blaster."
In those contract negotiations, the Union proposed that the Boiler
makers be paid the "dirty money" for the use of the "blaster;"
the Employer rejected the proposal and neither the contract provision nor the practice was changed.

I interpret this bargaining

history as recognition by the Union that the $2 premium did not
cover the use of the "blaster" by the Boilermakers.

I conclude

that the Union's position in the negotiations was not merely a
statement or reiteration of what it thought the contract already
covered, but rather an effort to enlarge the application of the
premium to cover the use of the "blaster" by the Boilermakers.
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As the negotiation effort was unavailing, that expansion cannot
be obtained through this proceeding.

It remains a matter for

collective bargaining.
A word of caution to the Employer.

I consider it to be a

significant distinction when the Employer asserts that the
"blaster" is a closed system that does not involve the "open"
exposure and other "dirty" conditions of the blasting performed
by the Painters.

But there is evidence in this record that the

"closed, vacuum" system of the blaster has not been working well
and is not as protective of the operating employees as it is
supposed to be.

The Employer is cautioned that steps must be

taken to insure the proper and protective use of the "blaster"
so that the essential difference between its use and traditional
sand blasting by the Painters is maintained in fact and in operation.

Unless that is done, or if the continued use of the

"blaster" by the Boilermakers is under "dirty" or "exposed"
conditions that are as unpleasant and/or "unsafe" to the operators
as are the conditions confronting the Painters, I, and possibly
a different subsequent arbitrator might well find that the use of
the "blaster" had constructively become, "sand or silica blasting"
within the meaning of Article XII Section 4.C(2) of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly hearing the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Article XII,
Section 4.C(2) of the contract when it
did not pay employees represented by Local
614 the premium stated therein.

DATED: June 13, 1986
STATE OF New York )_„
.
OO • *
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

AWARD

and
M & B Control Film Lab

The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and
Employer and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Union at a hearing on July 1, 1986, the above-named Employer having failed to appear at said hearing after due notice
makes the following AWARD:
1.

My Award of December 8, 1985 is reaffirmed. Therefore the Employer shall pay to
Tom Moran and Farrell Beazer one-half of
the difference between what they earned
working three days and what they would have
earned on a straight-time basis had they
worked five days during the period August
27 to October 20, 1985.

2.

I find that Paul Peluso, Michael Regino
and Joseph Moa are similarly situated to
Messrs. Moran and Beazer. Therefore the
Employer is also directed to pay to Messrs.
Peluso, Regino, and Moa the same amounts
of money as are due and owing Messrs. Moran
and Beazer.

3.

The Employer shall also pay to the Union the
sum of $500 which is the Employer's share of
the Arbitrator's fee in the prior case between
the parties, which the Employer has failed to
pay to the Arbitrator and which the Union has
advanced to the Arbitrator on the Employer's
behalf.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: July 7, 1986
STATE OF New York )Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
O.C.A.W., Local 8095

OPINION AND AWARD
Case I86K/05122
Grievance #15 - 85

and
Mobay Chemical Corporation
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have just cause to discharge
the grievant, Samuel L. Cook on or about
October 17, 1985?
A hearing was held on April 11, 1986 at which time Mr.
Cook, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the proceedings taken; and the Union and Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged for excessive absenteeism and
for insubordination.
If there is one rule uniformly accepted in industrial
relations and by arbitral decision, it is that an employee who
is chronically unable to maintain regular job attendance need
not be retained in employment even if his absenteeism is beyond
his fault or control.

That rule is based on the logical and

sensible proposition that an employer must be able to rely on
regular attendance by its employees to meet its production and
service obligations. It is this situation that presents itself
in this case.
The grievant is a short-term employee.

He was hired on

May 31, 1984 and discharged on October 17, 1985.

Over that period

of sixteen and one-half months he was unable to work the equivalent of 170 work days of the total 349 work days for which he was
scheduled.
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His absences were due to claimed disabilities from job
related and non-job related injuries; and from various claimed
illnesses.
I need not make determinations on the bona fides of these
claims, because, under the foregoing rule, and with the magnitude of the absentee record, the legitimacy of the reasons for
the absences are irrelevant.

That the Company may have recorded

many of his absences as "excused" only means that it accepted
his representations that they were due to illnesses or disabilities.

But it does not mean that the Company waived its basic

managerial right to terminate his employment for unsatisfactory
or irregular attendance.

Any such waiver, where a particular

absence was "excused" because of illness, would mean that on a
cumulative basis,

an employer would never be able to terminate

the employment of an employee who fails to come to work an excessive amount of time.

In short, though individual or separate

absences were accepted by the Company as due to illness or disability, the cumulative and excessive nature of the grievant's
absenteeism was not "excused;" nor did the Company waive its
right to take action in response to the grievant's cumulative
record.
As a short-term employee, and considering the magnitude
of the grievant's absentee record over the short period of his
employment, I find that he was adequately warned by the Company
that his record was unsatisfactory and that he risked discharge
if it didn't improve.

Under these same considerations, I do not

find that the Company had to impose a suspension, following verbal
warnings, before discharge would be justified.

Considering the
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magnitude of the absentee record; the short period of the grievant's employment and the apparent chronic nature of the grievant1
problems concerning his absenteeism, I am satisfied that the
Company adequately complied with "progressive discipline" requirements .
The many and various medical reasons and excuses offered
by the grievant for his absences and the quantity of those problems within the short period involved

leads me to accept the

Company's conclusion that the grievant's problems, with attendant inability to maintain regular job attendance are chronic
without any reasonable basis to expect improvement in the future.
Also, I do not find that the claimed procedural defect in
notifying the grievant and the Union of the discharge constituted
a defect fatal to the Company's action.
As the foregoing facts and determinations justify discharge,
it is unnecessary for me to deal with the charges of insubordination.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company had just cause to discharge the
grievant, Samuel L. Cook, on or about October
17, 1985.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 8, 1986
STATE OF New York )„„
.
O O *•
COUNTY OF New York )
k

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

E R I C J. S C H M E R T Z

P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK II55O
(516) 5 6 O - 5 8 5 4

August 25, 1986

Mr. Rudolph A. Lawton
New Jersey Education
Association
180 West State Street
P. 0. Box 1211
Trenton, New Jersey 08607
Dear Mr. Lawton:
I enclosed herewith my Report, Findings of
Fact and Determinations in the Matter of the New Jersey
Local Education Association Demand and Return System for
the membership year 1984-1985, together with my bill for
services.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Umpire
EJS:ht
Encl.

In the Matter of the

:

New Jersey Local Education Association

:

Demand and Return System

:

For the Membership Year 1984-1985

:

J

. ,
umpire s Report
„. , .
,. „
Findings or Fact
,
and
^
•
Determinations

The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, (attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit A), permits public employers and public employee unions to negotiate representation
fee provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Under those

provisions a public employer is permitted to withhold and the
majority union may receive a representative or "agency" fee
assessed against employees in the bargaining unit who choose not
to become members of the union representing them.
The Act was previously interpreted and held to be constitutional by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Robinson v. State
of New Jersey, Docket No. 82-5698 (3rd Circ. 1984).

The United

States Supreme Court also considered the agency fee charges permissible under the Railway Labor Act in Ellis v. B.R.A.C., Docket
No. 82-1150 (April 25, 1984).

The Ellis decision addressed the

validity of various charges as a matter of statutory interpretation and constitutional propriety. In Ellis, the Court held
that the standard for determining the propriety of the agency fee
expenditures under the Railway Labor Act is;
...whether the challenged expenditures are
necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Under this standard, objecting
employees may be compelled to pay their fair
share of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining contract and of settling grievances and
disputes, but also the expenses of activities

-2or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties
of the union as exclusive representative of
the employees in the bargaining unit. Ellis
v. B.R.A.C., si op. at p.11-12
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Ellis decision
only addresses chargeable expenditures under the Railway Labor
Act.

However, the Court in Robinson adopted the Ellis standard

for purposes of determining chargeable expenditures under the
New Jersey Act.

Thus at p. 20 (si. op.) the Robinson Court said

as follows:
This past term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the "germane to collective bargaining " standard for judging the use of mandatory fees over
an employee's objection:
[T]he test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties
of an exclusive representative of the employees
in dealing with the employer on labor-management
issues.
Later in its opinion, in a discussion of the mechanics of the
New Jersey Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, the Robinson
Court twice (at p. 26) repeated the Ellis standard.

Thus under

the New Jersey Act, a majority representative may charge an agency
fee for the costs of negotiating and administering a collective
bargaining agreement, settling grievances and disputes and also
for the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reason4ably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union
as exclusive representative of the employee in the bargaining
unit.
As noted above, certain expenditures are excluded for agency
fee purposes, i.e. they cannot be charged to nonmembers as an
agency fee.

1.

In particular, the New Jersey Act, at NJSA 34:13A~5

This scope of permissible expenditures is limited by certain
exceptions discussed later in this report.

-3.5(c) mandates a return of any part of an agency fee paid by a
nonmember attributable to expenditures either in aid of activitie
or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature only inci
dentally related to the terms and conditions of employment

. ..

In Robinson the Court held that the Federal District Court
had erred in restricting the use of agency fees to lobbying purposes only to secure agency or legislative action required to
implement a collective bargaining agreement.

The Robinson Court,

at pps. 24~25, in analyzing the issue, recognized that a public
employee union, to be effective, must seek its goals in other
forums, beyond the bargaining table (i.e. administrative, judicia'.
and legislative).

The Robinson Court discussed the workings of

the New Jersey Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, and the
importance of lobbying in relation to the Act, stating as follows
For New Jersey public employees, collective
bargaining is inextricably intertwined with
legislative change. An examination of the
mechanics of New Jersey's public employee collective bargaining agreements reveals to what
extent the standard terms and conditions of
employment under the NLRA or the RLA are governed by state statute or regulation. Cf.
FiberboardPaper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor
Law, 496-523 (1976) (review of mandatory subjects of bargaining under NLRA). For example,
an affidavit submitted by M. Don Sanchez, the
New Jersey Area Director of the CWA, in the
Olsen proceedings, listed no fewer than fifteen
traditional subjects of bargaining that are
governed by New Jersey statutes, civil service
rules, administrative regulations, or executive
orders. Among these are pensions, overtime,
subcontracting, employee transfers, safety and
health, medical plans. App. at 101-15.
Since many of the essential terms and conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining under Sections 8(d) and
9(a) of the NLRA are governed by state authorities in the public employment context, a
public employee union unable to lobby the state
authority would be severely handicapped in performing its duties as a bargaining representative.
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The Robinson Court then concluded that charges of agency
fees for lobbying are permissible "so long as the lobbying activities are pertinent to the duties of the union as a bargaining representative and are not used to advance the political and
ideological positions of the union," and;
Under NJSA 34:13A~5.5, a union is allowed to
charge against representation fees the costs
of lobbying activities designed to foster
policy goals in collective negotiations and
contract administration or to secure for the
employees represented advantages in wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment in
addition to those secured through collective
negotiations with the public employer. (at p.26)
Significant since this Umpire's Report, Findings of Fact
and Determinations for the 1983-1984 membership year, has been
the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Booton Board
of Education of the Town of Booton v. Judith M. Kramer (A-124)
(decided June 25, 1985).

Responding to the challenge in that

case to the lobbying activities that are authorized by the 1979
amendments to the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act and
that are supported by nonmeinber representation fees, the Court
ruled that said lobbying activities are not repugnant to First
Amendment freedoms so long as they are germane to policy goals
in collective negotiations and contract administration or to advantages in wages, hours and other conditions of employment in
order to invoke the State's interest in achieving stability in
public-employee relations.
Specifically, the Court stated:
The statute's broad recognition of lobbying
activities as an essential element of public
employee union activity accurately reflects
the significant quantum of public employee
rights and benefits that are determined outside the collective negotiation process.
Public employees in New Jersey are substantially affected by state and local budgetary
decisions and by the various laws and regulations that determine conditions of employment
as much as, if not more than, by the negotiations conducted by their majority representative. Indeed, many of the most important
benefits of public employment are determined
by statute and a public employee union that

-5ignored this reality would not represent
properly the members and nonmembers of its
bargaining unit. See Abood, supra, 431 U.S.
at 227-32, 97 S. Ct. at
, 52 L.Ed. 2d at
279-81; C.W. Summers, "Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking,"
44 Gin. L. Rev. 669 (1975). Respondent unions
can readily identify a number of state statutes
that directly affect conditions of employment
for public school teachers and that would
appear to be likely subjects for lobbying
activity. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 18A:66~1 to
192 (Teachers Pension and Annuity Fund);
N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1 to 17 (tenure); N.J.S.A.
ISA:6~30 and -30.1 (compensation for wrongful
suspension or discharge); N.J.S.A. 18A:27~1
to -13 (hiring, contracts, evaluation of nontenured teachers, continuation and termination
of employment, and authorization of school
board rules governing employment of teachers);
and N.J.S.A. 18A:30-1 to -8 (sick leave and
work related disabilities).
Accordingly, under the Act, as judicially interpreted, and
consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, any portion of a nonmember's agency fee used for a proscribed purpose is to be refunded to that nonmember on demand.
To meet the foregoing requirements; to avoid the use or
expenditure of any portion of a nonmember agency fee for a prohibited purpose; to institutionalize an impartial determination
of whether an agency fee has been used improperly; and to facilitate the process of making refunds if necessary, the New Jersey
Education Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association
or as NJEA," receives from its local affiliates, hereinafter referred to as "local association[s]" an amount equal to 85% of
the dues normally charged members, times the number of agency
fee payers, as the cumulative agency fee for nonmembers under
collective bargaining agreements with agency fee provisions; and
the "local associations" have promulgated Demand and Return Systems, attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit B.
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These Systems were held to satisfy constitutional requirements
in Robinson v. State of New Jersey, and Booton Board of Education
of the Town of Booton v. Judith M. Kramer, supra.

However, as

a result of the March 4, 1986 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, the NJEA has
reviewed the systems used by its locals and has concluded that
these systems may not fully meet the constitutional tests outlined in Hudson.
Nevertheless, in accordance with Section A of said Demand
and Return System, I was again retained as the Representation
Fee Umpire "to determine the percentage of the Association's dues
income for the 1984-1985 membership year that was expended for
purposes related to negotiations, administering collective bargaining agreements, settling grievances and disputes involving
activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to
implement or effectuate the duties of the Union as exclusive
representative of employees in the bargaining unit," and, per
force conversely, the percentage, if any, of its expenditures
used for purposes not related to those activities, which if
supported or paid for by any portion of an agency fee would constitute an improper use of such fee, entitling the nonmember to
a refund in the amount so used.
The Association has satisfied me that to the extent possible
it has moved to comply with the provisions of Hudson as they
affect fee payers for the 1984-1985 membership year and has sent
a second notice to all fee payers, including those who did not
previously object to the fee, advising them of their rights to
object and providing them with sufficient documentation to form
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an "adequate explanation of the basis of the fee...1.
The Association has advised me that by retention of the Representation Fee Umpire for the 1984-1985 membership year it is
moving to meet those requirements of the Demand and Return System
which may satisfy the needs of objecting fee payers, and to
comply with those assurances expressly given to fee payers who
have objected to the fee.
I am further pursuaded by the Decision of the New Jersey
Public Employee Relations Commission Appeal Board in the case
of

Jonathan Mallamud v. the Rutgers Council of American Assoc-

iationof University Professors Chapters that the use of the
Demand and Return System for the 1984-1985 membership year is
a proper first step in determining the appropriateness of the
representation fees charged.
In accordance with Section A of said Demand and Return
System, the Undersigned was selected to serve as the Representation Fee Umpire "to determine the percentage of the Association's
dues income for the 1984-1985 membership year that was expended
for purposes related to negotiations, administering collective
bargaining agreements, settling grievances and disputes involving activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed
to implement or effectuate the duties of the Union as exclusive
representative of employees in the bargaining unit," and, per
force conversely, the percentage, if any, of its expenditures
used for purposes not related to those activities, which if
supported or paid for by any portion of an agency fee would constitute an improper use of such fee, entitling the nonmember to

1.

Hudson p. 17, section VI
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a refund in the amount so used.
In carrying out my assignment I have been guided by the
aforesaid situations, and also by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and
other relevant court citations related thereto.
I met with representatives of the Association.

At my re-

quest I was provided with the Association's budget for the 19841985 membership year, the audited statement of its actual expenses for that year, underlying documents and other original
material affirming and supportive of said expenses, its Reports
to the Delegate Assembly dated January 18, 1986, detailed and
extensive written and verbal statements of the activities and
responsibilites of the various divisions of the Association for
which there are budget allocations and expenditures, and examples
of the "work product" or services of those divisions in the form
of reports, publications, memoranda, programs and research.
I interviewed Directors of the Association, or representatives of the divisions for which there were budget allocations
and expenditures

during the 1984-1985 membership year.

I am

satisfied that with regard to budgetary expenditures, my discussions with those persons, and my

examinations of the records and

activities for which they are responsible, were comprehensive,
searching and thorough.
FINDINGS OF FACT
During the 1984-1985 membership year the Association's total
expenditures (for the purposes of this report overwhelmingly and
materially from dues), was $19,414^205.

That amount was appor-

tioned among and accounted for by the following nine divisions
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with the amounts spent by each division as follows:
UniServ
Legal Services
Research & Economic Services
Communications
Government Relations
Instruction and Training
Business Division
Governance and Administration
Fringe Benefits

$ 5,024,592
2,636,983
970,075
1,732,395
361,703
1,070,783
3,711,854
1,827,718
2,078,102

A description of the responsibilities and activities of the
foregoing divisions

and my determinations of which of said

activities and the expenditures thereof fall within the category
for which the use of funds from an agency fee is proscribed, are
as follows:
UNI-SERV DIVISION
UNISERV HEADQUARTERS' OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for headquarters'
based staff.
ACTIVE SUPPORTIVE
This category provides for promotion, organizing
efforts, leadership training and a newsletter for
active supportive members. This appropriation
supplements the funds presently included in other
accounts for service to active supportive members.
MEMBERSHIP MEETINGS
To cover the cost of postage, travel, meals, promotion, and materials to aid membership orientation and information exchange.
MEMBERSHIP PROMOTION
To provide for forms, promotional materials, postage, and other expenses for conducting the annual
membership campaign.
NEGOTIATION CONSULTANTS
NJEA negotiation consultants assist UniServ representatives in actively representing teachers and
other school personnel in negotiations with school
boards and in processing of grievances. The requested amount is for earnings, expenses, and employer's share of state and federal taxes.
STRENGTHEN LOCALS
To provide emergency financial assistance to local
associations experiencing exceptional problems and
challenges and to defeat attempts by other membership organizations to raid the membership. (See
Except for reasons later explained, the Division of Governance
and Administration and "Fringe Benefits."
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Revenue page for NEA supplement under (Organizing Support.)
HIGHER EDUCATION
To provide for materials, postage, newsletters,
conferences, periodicals, and leadership training for the Higher Education Unit.
REGIONAL OFFICES PERSONNEL
Provides for staffing of eighteen (18) UniServ
offices, including the Higher Education Office.
REGIONAL OFFICES OPERATING COSTS
Provides for office materials and supplies,
travel and meal expenses, telephone, postage,
and various miscellaneous items.
REGIONAL OFFICES RENT
Provides for the rentals of eighteen (18)
UniServ offices and for related custodial
and utilities requirements.
REGIONAL OFFICES FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT
Provides for the replacement and amortization
of typewriters, copiers, and other business
machines and office furniture.
Based on the entire record before me I conclude that the
foregoing activities and expenditures are related to collective
bargaining, contract administration or grievance handling within
the controlling statutory and judicially determined meaning there
of except the following:
Uni-Serv Headquarters Office
That portion of the costs and expenditures devoted to NJEA and NEA convention staffing, PTA
and School Board Association Activities and outof-state meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$78,480

Active Supportive
That portion of costs and expenditures devoted
to members only benefitsand organizing or political activity,
in the amount of

$89 , 827

Membership Meetings
That portion of those meetings devoted to memberonly benefits and political activities,
in the amount of

$30,340

Membership Promotion
That portion of expenditures devoted to materials which promote members-only benefits, i.e.,
attorney referral program, supplemental economic services, etc.,
in the amount of

$12,528

-11Negotiation Consultants
That portion of these expenditures was used
for the NEA Unification campaign during 19841985,

in the amount of

$66 , 606

Strengthening Locals
That portion of these expenditures was used
for organizing purposes in Newark and for
staff meeting expenses,
in the amount of

$17,020

1. Higher Education
That portion of meetings and materials devoted to member-only benefits and organizing or political activities in state colleges,
in the amount of

$ 4,223

2. Uni-Serv Regional Office Personnel
That portion of staff activities devoted to
NJEA Convention Staffing, PSA/NSO, GSA activities, pension consultations, travel inquiries, attorney referral program, out-of-state
meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$294,697

3. Regional Operating Costs
That portion of expenditures and costs devoted to member-only benefits and political
activity,
in the amount of

$18,621

4. Regional Offices Rent
That portion of rental space devoted to member-only benefits and political activity,
in the amount of

$15 ,729

5. Regional Offices Furniture & Equipment
That portion of furniture and equipment devoted or allocatable to member-only benefits
and political activity,
in the amount of
TOTAL

$ 5,318
$633,389

LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION
Maintains legal protection and support for bargaining unit
members and local Associations in cases involving job security
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employee discipline, breaches of law or contract by school boards.
Pays one-half cost of local arbitrations service maintained
through 16 retained law firms and headquarters staff in executive office.
Promotes and protects professional rights of members and
affiliates through the Professional Rights and Responsibilities
Committees.

Financial assistance is granted for affirmative

action in such diverse areas of concern as non-tenure

teacher

rights, academic freedom, court suits, negotiations, tenure protection, withholding of increments, hardship cases, restraining
orders, suspensions unilateral board actions, pension appeals,
assault and battery charges, fact-finding inquiries, and arbitration hearings.
I conclude that a portion of the cases and
legal matters handled by the Division of
Legal Services falls within the area of
proscribed activities. These activities
are, agency shop litigation expenses, legal
costs of bargaining elections, certifications
and civil service legal matters, and the attendant staff costs,
in the amount of

$43 , 015

RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC SERVICE DIVISION
Responsible for analyzing

contracts and publishing periodic

studies of the various provisions in current collective bargaining contracts; consults with and assists field staff and local
associations with school district budget analysis, fact-finding,
salary guide construction and other financial aspects of collective bargaining; coordinates
conference

research segment of annual training

designed to assist local negotiators; analyzes proposed

legislation in order to identify bills which would be damaging to
local bargaining efforts and other NJEA activities; answers
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occasional questions dealing with unemployment insurance.

Pro-

vides sample survey research services primarily relative to the
Association's collective bargaining stance; performs general research projects primarily directed at responding to requests from
local association leaders and field staff for information necessary for collective bargaining or grievance arbitration.
Maintains the Research Library with duties of analyzing
legal decisions, arbitration awards, Public Employment Relation
Commission rulings, and individual legal opinions; creates indexes of the aforementioned materials in order that they will be
accessible to field representatives, local negotiators and grievance chair persons; provides full text of such materials upon
request from field representatives, local negotiators and grievance chair persons; distributes NJEA statistical bulletins for
collective bargaining upon request.
Collects information from local school districts and state
agencies and prepares statistical bulletins and circulars based
upon such information for collective bargaining.
Conducts individual consultations to and with members in the
areas of pensions, fringe benefits; conducts workshops for members concerning pensions and fringe benefit programs.

Responsible

for NJEA Special Services program which consists of a variety of
offerings for members' benefits including the Washington National
Group Income Protection Plan, the Magic Kingdom Club, the TSO
loan program and the Travel Service.
I conclude that the costs and expenditures
allocated to Special Services for members
only (except the Travel Service), a portion
of salaries of employees when they deal with
research on matters unrelated to collective
bargaining, contract administration or grievance processing, a portion of the costs of
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costs and expenditures related to collective
bargaining, contract administration and grievance processing. The costs and expenditures
of the Travel Service are not among those prohibited. No dues or agency fees are used for
that purpose. The costs are covered by revenue
earned by the Travel Service. I calculate the
total proscribed costs to be,
in the amount of

$160,468
COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
Provides for personnel cost for the Communications Division.
AUDIO-VISUAL PROGRAMS
Provides for the purchase of materials and
equipment to be used by the Media Center for
the production of audio-visual and training
films.
PRESS RELATIONS
Provides for materials, postage, and supplies
used for press releases and relations. The
amount includes funds for the President's
column to appear in the Sunday Star Ledger and
Philadelphia Inquirer, N.J. Supplement.
PUBLIC MEDIA
To provide printed, visual, and audio materials,
billboards for public consumption in connection
with NJEA campaigns and positions (i.e. tenure,
school finance and taxes, reduction in force).
Also, to provide to locals materials for community relations activities.
LOCAL LEADER
Provides for thirty-five (35) weekly mailings
and ten (10) monthly mailings to leaders of
1700 local and county affiliates and ten (10)
mailings to 6800 association representatives.
REVIEW MAGAZINE
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing,
and art work for the production of NJEA's
magazine, the REVIEW.
REPORTER
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing,
and art work for the REPORTER.
I conclude that the following activities and the expenditures related thereto as indicated below are not related to collective bargaining, contract administration
ing.

and grievance process
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Audio-Visual
Small percentage of radio tapes and video
tapes used to support political action programs ,
in the amount of

$ 4,783

Press Relations
News media staff gives support to notify
public of recommendations of political
action committee and of other member activities on behalf of "educator for"
committees,
in the amount of

$35 ,128

Public Media Projects
Portion of local community relations training and organizing funds used to assist local affiliates that wish to be active on behalf of budgets and/or candidates in local
school elections. Most of this account is
for paid newspaper, magazine, billboard and
radio ads — none of which is used other than
to enhance image of members represented and
to support members' bargaining efforts. A
portion of this budget (8%) in Campaign and
Organizing and in Materials covers training,
building posters, and special promotions designed to get out a "YES" vote for local school
budgets in April, as well as assist local committees working on behalf of the election of
board members,
in the amount of

$41, 607

Review
Monthly magazine carries articles on education developments in general and by State
agencies that impact on work of members represented. Very small portion of magazine
deals with political action activities. Occasional magazine articles deal with controversial social issues outside the realm of
education work of members represented,
in the amount of

$80 , 890

Local Leader
Special weekly mailings to affiliate presidents and monthly mailings to association
representatives in each building deal mostly with leadership material in support of
bargaining and representational issues. Occasional information is carried on political
action efforts,
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in the amount of

$ 7,462

Reporter
Monthly newspaper is main vehicle for informing membership when political activities do
take place. However, this is mainly done in
October endorsement issue. Last year 15% of
the Reporter's pages were used specifically
for reporting on Political Action endorsements.
Special October issue prints distributes organization's annual convention program. This
includes a small portion of programming on
controversial social issues outside the realm
of education work of members represented,
in the amount of

$37 ,111

Service to Other Divisions
Publications and media support is provided for
programs operated by other divisions, some of
which is beyond normal representational activity,
in the amount of

$13 , 937

TOTAL

$220,918.
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
The activity of Government Relations centers around three

major responsibilities:
1)
2)
3)

lobbying
political action
regulatory aspects of State agencies

LOBBYING
This includes extraordinary contact with intern^
al bodies (e.g., Executive Committee, Delegate
Assembly, Government Relations Committee); regular contact with corporate legal counsel; daily
contact with officials of government including
Secretary of State, Attorney General, Department
of Banking, Department of Civil Service, Department of Community Affairs, Department of Education, Department of Higher Education, Department
of Human Services, Department of Insurance, Department of Labor & Industry, Department of the
Treasury, and Chief Counsel; 40 members of the
N.J. Senate; 80 members of the N.J. General
Assembly; approximately 240 government aides; 2
U.S. Senators; 14 members of the U.S, House of
Representatives. Also contact with a couple of
hundred people in N.J. public affairs, including
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N.J. Citizen Action, labor unions, drinking
age, etc., with local affiliate presidents
as requested by the NJEA UniServ offices; and
with the NEA Government Relations staff on
federal legislative matters.
Activities of this Division which fall in the proscribed
categories as unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance handling, as defined by statute and
court decisions, can be best quantified by percentages of the
Division Budget in the three areas of:
Legislative Conference
Legislative Field Project
Legislative Publications
Included in the foregoing are the following lobbying activities during the membership year 1984-1985 not related to permissable activities:
A-623

-

Designated "The Gifted Child Education Act."

A-1050

-

Establishes standard procedures to be followed
by a county board of taxation in hearing appeals
of tax assessment concerning multiple dwellings.

A-3552

-

Establishes the Missing Children Clearinghouse
in the Division of State Police.

A-2541

-

Establishes a program for school-aged child
care in public schools; appropriates $3,400,000.

A-3375

-

Reduces the number of course hours of instruction for licensure as a cosmetologist-hair
stylist for public school vocational students.

A-2376

-

Appropriates $125,000 to the Educational Information and Resource Center in Sewell.

A-546

-

Provides for the control of smoking in places
of employment.

A-547

-

Provides for the control of smoking in certain
restaurants.

A~548

-

Provides for the control of smoking in government buildings.

A-2498

-

Provides for categorical program support by the
State for educational programs for autistic
pupils.
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A-632

-

Requires local boards of education to establish
standards for pupil retention and promotion and
provide remedial instruction for students who
fail to meet the standards.

A-519

-

Permits the continued use of school buses for
15 years from the date of its registration.

A-104

-

Provides for computer education programs in
public schools.

S-2126

-

Designated the "Computer Literacy Act," provides
for the establishment of five computer education
pilot projects by the Commission of Education.

A-225

-

Establishes a statewide comprehensive program
and diploma requirements for secondary school
pupils.

A~86

-

Provides for a major teacher initiative in the
areas of mathematics and science.

S-1845

-

Permits students in certain schools to participate in a 1-minute period of silence before the
opening of each school day.

A-l

-

Establishes procedures for exercising the power
of initiative and referendum.

A-2

-

Provides for distribution of informational
materials on public questions and initiative
and referendum questions.

S-2675

-

Extends the life of the Commission on Sex Discrimination in the statutes to January 12, 1986.

POLITICAL ACTION
The authority for NJEA PAC is found in the
NJEA PAC Guidelines: "History." A Political
Action Study Committee was established by the
NJEA Delegate Assembly in November 1971 to
explore the feasibility of political action
by NJEA members to the extent of endorsing
candidates and participating in political
campaigns for their election to office.
Reaching the conclusion that the NJEA should
establish a political action committee closely
allied to the NJEA structure, the Study Committee recommended an information program for
the membership which was adopted by the NJEA
Delegate Assembly in May 1972. NJEA Delegate
Assembly approval at its November 1972 meeting signaled the beginning of organized political action for the teachers of New Jersey.
In February 1973, the NJEA Executive Committee
adopted general guiding principles and established the NJEA PAC fund.
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As with lobbying, there is a tremendous amount of internal contact which must be
maintained in the political action field.
Many of the comments on people contact,
the work done and informational writing
are similar in political action. The
Division deals with:
--offices of the Democratic and Republican
parties
—county chairpersons of the Democratic and
Republican parties
—240 party candidates plus independents
—campaign managers
—work with coalitions on certain candidates
—media people
—NJEA member volunteers to approximately 5060 campaigns—NJEA PAC Operating Committee (comprised of
the NJEA Executive Committee, County Presidents, and NJEA Government Relations Committee)
—NJEA PAC Board of Trustees (comprised of the
NJEA Executive Committee)
—Federal Elections Commission
—Clerk of the U.S. Senate
—Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives
—N.J. Election Law Enforcement Commission
--Attorney General's office
—NEA-PAC staff
AGENCY MONITORING
Agency monitoring became a responsibility of
the NJEA Government Relations Division by NJEA
Executive Committee approval of a staff reorganization plan in August 1981
As in lobbying and political action, there is
considerable and external contact with people
and public bodies, for example:
—members of the Certification, Evaluation and
tenure Committee
--Commissioner of Education
--approximately 20 members of the State Department of Education staff bureaucracy
—State Board of Education
—State Board of Higher Education
—State Board of Examiners
—State Department of Education-related commissions, councils, advisory committees, on
which some 30 NJEA members and staff serve
—3 Regional Curriculum Service Units
I find expenditures of the budget for Legislative
Conference involved proscribed activities,
in the amount of

$

NONE
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Expenditures of the budget for Legislative
Field Project involved proscribed activities,
in the amount of

$49 , 688

Expenditures of the budget for Legislative Publications involved proscribed activities,
in the amount of

$ 1,724

Portion of salaries related to impermissible
activities,
in the amount of
Total amount of

$18,196
$69 , 608

INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING
INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs of the Instruction and Training Division, including the
Professional Development Institute.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for the protection and enhancement of professional rights; i.e. teacher evaluation, compensatory education, tenure,
certification, and assistance to local associations .
INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for activities related to
furtherance of educational quality, i.e,
human relations, high school graduation requirements, violence and vandalism, migrant
education, environmental education, gifted
talented standards, exceptional children,
Good Ideas Conference, etc.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT & IN-SERVICE
To provide funds for television in-service
series, cooperative projects with colleges
and other organizations and professional
development project feasibility study.
PROGRAM DEyELOPMENT
To provide funds for addressing emerging
critical issues and special activities; i.e.,
recertification, monitoring State Board of
Education, EIC's and teacher centers.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE
Provides funds for establishing the components of the Institute (transcript service,
directory, endorsement of programs, registry,
certificates of attendance, etc.) as operating services.
LEADERSHIP WORKSHOPS
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage,
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travel, meals promotion and materials at various local leader conferences during the year.
LEADERSHIP OPERATIONS
This is the basic training account. It provides for materials, supplies, and expenses
for leadership training at the local level.
Included are the cost of handbooks, new
teacher kits, and cost of providing the A/R
Handbook.
SUMMER LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage,
travel, meals, promotion and materials for
Workshops I and II at Montclair State College.
Funds are also included for grants to aid locals
in sending Association Representatives to the
Workshop.
TRAINING CONSULTANTS
Provides for part-time training consultants to
assist locals in workshops of a professional
nature.
CONVENTION PROGRAMS
Provides funds for programmatic expenses, staff
accommodations and meals, promotional activities
and materials, group meetings, dances and other
functions, printing and distribution of the program and directory and aid to affiliated groups.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures are
not related to collective bargaining, contract administration
or grievance processing.
The job location service and the Impaired
School Employee Program,
in the amount of

$23 , 095

The costs of the specialized services and
materials relating to the performance and
working conditions of the employee at the
worksite, which are available for members
only,
in the amount of

$26,477

A portion of the costs of the Summer Leadership Conference devoted to political activity,
in the amount of

$ 5,145

Costs related to the annual NJEA convention
(for members only),
in the amount of
For a total of

$76,112
$130,829
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BUSINESS DIVISION
BUSINESS OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for the business office, as well as for temporary and
contracted help for total operations.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and equipment costs for the accounting office.
COMPUTER CENTER
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and computer equipment and software amortization costs. Also included are funds for
the replacement of fully depreciated air
conditioning equipment.
MEMBERSHIP PROCESSING
Provides for personnel, contracted services,
membership processing reimbursement to locals,
supplies, materials, and postage for this unit.
The proposed amount includes funds for improving the dues accounting system.
HEADQUARTERS' OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies and materials,
taxes, mortgage amortization, maintenance, building repairs and renovations, equipment replacement repairs and rentals custodial services,
utilities and insurance for NJEA headquarters.
CAPITOL STREET OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies and materials,
taxes, maintenance, equipment rental and replacement and servicing, utilities for the mail
room, storage room and space for NJEA Travel
Service.
ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT
To provide kits and materials to be used for
the improvement of local organizational management. Funds are also requested to cover workshops for local officers; i.e., Presidents' and
Treasurers ' Workshops.
CONVENTION EXPOSITION
Provides for Convention Hall rental, decorating
and drayage services, exhibit kits, security and
other facility related costs in Atlantic City.
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION
Provides for the renovation and rehabilitation
of the NJEA Headquarters building. The lower
level is completed. The funds requested are
to begin work on the upper levels. It is anticipated that this will be a two year project
with additional funding needed from next year's
budget.
NEA CONVENTION
The amount proposed is based upon full funding
for up to 450 state delegates, in addition to
funds for operating, administrative, and function expenses while at the Convention.
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Provides funds for the first phase of a three
phase computer network with NJEA Headquarters
and regional offices.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures, calculated primarily in the amount of time spent by staff of this
Division on matters unrelated to collective bargaining,

con-

tract administration and grievance handling are:
2.65% of the time of the Director's office,
in the amount of

$ 6,113

5.17% of the time of the staff of Data Processing/Computer Center/Office Automation
(for politicalcampaign purposes),
in the amount of

$44 , 639

11.21% of the time of the staff of the accounting office (for political oriented transactions),
in the amount of

$13 , 037

5.10% of the time of the staff of Membership
Processing, (for political campaign purposes),
in the amount of

$15,193

9.17% of the time of Capitol Street Operations
(for political activities),
in the amount of

$30,721

Plus the net cost and expenses of the NJEA Convention (for members only),
in the amount of

$226 , 506

Plus overhead costs related to the foregoing,
in the amount of
For a total of

$171,515
$507,724

The total, foregoing, "proscribed" costs and expenditures
during the 1984-1985 membership year total, $1,721,941 or 11.1%
of the total NJEA budget and expenditures for that year.
I consider it logical and appropriate therefore to conclude
that 11.1% of Governance and Administration Division expenses
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is attributable to excluded activities, in the amount of
$202,877
and that 11.1% of the Fringe Benefit account be treated similarly
in the amount of

$230,669 .

Accordingly, the total amount of expenditures during the
1984-1985 membership year that were unrelated to the statutory
and/or judicially determined matters of collective bargaining,
contract administration or grievance handling is
$2,155,487.
The foregoing total constitutes 11.1% of the total NJEA
expenditures for the 1984-1985 membership year.
DETERMINATION
11.1% of the total NJEA budget and expenditures for the 1984-1985 membership year were
for activities statutorily or judicially determined to be unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance
processing, and may not be financed from representative or "agency" fees paid by nonmembers. Conversely, 88.9% of the total budget and expenditures were used for permitted
activities on behalf of nonmember as well as
members. As the nonmember paid an "agency"
fee only 85% of what a member paid in dues,
I conclude that the NJEA spent more for permitted activities on behalf of nonmembers
(as well as members) than nonmembers contributed toward those activities. Inasmuch as
the representative or "agency" fee of a nonmember was 15% less than the dues paid paid
a member, it would appear that none of the
proscribed activities were paid for out of an
agency fee. Accordingly, nonmembers are not
entitled to refunds from the NJEA portion of
the representation fee.

Eric J. Schmertz
Representation Fee Umpire
DATED: August 25, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Umpire that I am the individualdescribed in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance dated October 28, 1985 on behalf
of Robert Warbington?
A hearing was duly held at which time Mr. Warbington, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were af-

forded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The grievant, with greater seniority and another junior employee, Lynval Mullings had essentially the same geographical
second leg of a tripper schedule.

The difference between the two

was that Mullings started his trip at Einstein Loop, Coop City at
8:20 AM and the grievant started at 8:30 AM.
When ridership fell off, the Employer decided that only one
of these trips was needed.

Because Mullings' first leg ended in

Manhattan earlier than the grievant's first leg, thereby permitting him to return directly to Einstein Loop for the disputed
second leg earlier than the grievant, and because, with only one
of the two trips to survive, the Employer wanted the opportunity
to load passengers from ten to fifteen minutes earlier at Einstein
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Loop on inclement days.

Hence, the Employer picked Mullings to

continue the trip; changed his official start time to 8:30 AM,
and put the grievant on standby.

(Though from time to time dur-

ing the relevant period when ridership increased, the grievant
was called upon to make the trip too).
Clearly the Employer has the right to discontinue runs and
trippers, to change their schedules, and to make run and tripper
combinations for operational needs.

In the instant case it had

the right to discontinue one of the two trips involved.

But I

fail to see why the grievant's trip was not the one to survive.
The surviving trip, driven by Mullings, covered the same
route as did the second leg of the grievant's tripper.

With the

changed starting time for Mullings, his surviving trip became
identical with the grievant's original bid under the contract and
with the tripper the grievant had operated.
The record before me does not persuade me that operational
needs warranted the selection of Mullings, the junior employee,
to operate a run or part of a tripper different (as to starting
time) from what Mullings had previously operated, and apparently
identical with the grievant's prior assignment.

The Employer

justifies it on the grounds of the need for early loading of
passengers at Einstein Loop on days of inclement weather; that
Mullings' full tripper, particularly the first leg thereof, brought
him back in time to meet that specific operational need, and that
the schedule of the grievant's first leg did not allow for this
time leeway.
The evidence does not establish this operational need in
favor of Mullings.

At the end of the first leg of their respective

trippers, Mullings deadheaded from 23rd Street to Einstein Loop
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at approximately 7:30 AM, and the grievant at approximately 7:45
AM.

As a result, though Mullings arrived at Einstein Loop before

the grievant, the evidence does not show that the grievant could
not get back in time to load passengers on inclement days ten to
fifteen minutes before the official 8:30 AM departure.

Indeed,

the grievant testified that he and his bus were regularly available at Einstein Loop by 8:05 or 8:10 AM.
directly or effectively refuted.

This testimony was not

That being so, the grievant

could have met the changed operational needs of the Employer.
At least, in my view, the Employer should have tried it tha
way, thereby according proper contractual credit to the seniority
arrangements for picks of runs and trippers.
In short, though the Employer may eliminate runs and trippers, and may change the operating hours of runs and trippers, th
changes made under the instant facts and circumstances were unjustified exercises of those otherwise managerial rights, and henc
not proper uses of managerial prerogatives.
However, the grievant does not and did not have the remedy
of a new pick.

The contract requires mutual agreement of the

parties for a new pick to be offered, and there was no mutual
agreement in this case.

But the grievant may have suffered some

monetary damage by the Employer's action.
to a monetary remedy.

If so, he is entitled

Accordingly, for the improper elimination

(or periodic elimination) of the second leg of his tripper, the
grievant shall be made whole for wages lost, if any.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:

!
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Within the limitations of the foregoing
Opinion, the Union's grievance dated
October 28, 1985 on behalf of Robert
Warbington is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: December 9, 1986
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Sections 1, 2, 34(a)
and Exhibit B of the contract when a supervisor performed road calls on disabled buses
instead of bargaining unit mechanics? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 12, 1986 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case,
and limited to the two incidents presented in this arbitration,
I do not find that the two road services performed by Supervisor
Richard Johnson on December 6, 1985 violated the contract.
On that day, all the bargaining unit mechanics were occupied
on other work.

One bargaining unit mechanic was out ill and two

bargaining unit mechanics scheduled for overtime did not report.
Also, as a result of Department of Transportation inspections,
extra mechanical defects, "written up" by the Department, required
attention and correction without delay.
At that time, and against the backdrop of those circumstances
Johnson went out twice that day to two buses disabled on the road.
To one he delivered two batteries to a bargaining unit mechanic
on the scene and at the other he made some electrical repairs
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which took about ten minutes.

I consider his road service in

those instances to be minor, of short duration, and, if not an
emergency, at least of some immediacy to get those two buses
moving.

To send out a bargaining unit mechanic from the garage

for the short time and minor work involved would have meant stopping mechanical work that was more significant and more demanding
for the overall operation of the Company's service.
Applied to the facts in this case, I do not find that the
contract sections cited by the Union, bar Johnson from doing what
he did, under the conditions and at the time involved.
Whether the Company has the general right to assign supervisors to perform road service, or whether there are limits on
the times or circumstances under which such work may be carried
out, are matters not presently before me.

Therefore, I make no

determinations one way or the other on those broader questions.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract
when Supervisor Johnson performed two
road calls on December 6, 1985.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 18, 1986
STATE OF New York ) o
_ _o •.•
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of America

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties at a
hearing on August 18, 1986, sets forth below his Award as annouced
at the conclusion of said hearing:
The discharge of George Thompson is
reduced to a disciplinary suspension.
He shall be reinstated without back
pay.

Eric J./bchmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: September 9, 1986
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

,

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
John Knight? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on August 18 and September 11, 1986
at which time Mr. Knight, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharge for an unsatisfactory driving
record.

Company Exhibit A in the record sets forth the grievant's

"Disiciplinary Warnings, Violations and Union Hearings" from the
date of his employment on February 27, 1981 to his

discharge on

April 16, 1986, and the appeal of that discharge on April 23, 1986]
The grievant's record as set forth therein through March
19, 1985 is undisputed.
iously discharged

It is also undisputed that he was prev-

on July 14, 1983 and reinstated by the Employer

on July 20, 1983.
Beginning with the recorded violations of October 5, 1985,
the Employer has proved in this proceeding, the allegations (or
substantial parts thereof) of that violation and those listed in
Company Exhibit A and dated November 12, 1985, January 13, 1986,
April 4, 1986 and April 15, 1986.

The Employer has not proved the
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grievant's culpability with regard to the incident of March 27,
1986.
The grievant's record of proved violations beginning
October 5, 1985 and those conceeded prior thereto warrant disciplinary action, but also the meaningful application of progressive
disicipline.
Following his reinstatement

in July 1983, the Employer

began a new "progressive discipline" cycle. He was warned for the
accident of November 12, 1985, and for the violation of January
13, 1986 he was suspended one day and "advised that future problems will result in

discipline up to and including discharge."

Thereafter came the violation of April 4, 1986 which did not trigge
his discharge, and the violation of April 15, 1986 which did.
I am not satisfied that the Employer's new cycle of progressive discipline was sufficiently forceful or meaningful to
properly lead to the later discharge in this case.

Considering

the grievant's overall record, I do not find that a one day suspension was sufficiently punative or severe enough to put the
grievant on notice that subsequent violations would result in his
discharge.

A suspension, in the sequence of "progressive disci-

pline" must be of such an impact and

consequence as to make known

to an employee in a tangible way, like the loss of pay and employment for a meaningful period of time, that the Employer is dissatisfied with his work record and that failure to correct that
record will

mean termination.

A one day suspension in this case

and a verbal warning fell short of the meaningfulness and consequence that I think was necessary in this

particular situation.

o

(I note that in the Brooks decision, decided this date as well,
the Employer had imposed a four day suspension on a short term
employee.

That was a suspension of sufficient magnitude).

In

the instant case the grievant was longer employed and had a longer
and more extensive unsatisfactory record.

With the commencement

of the new progressive disciplinary cycle, the Employer should
have imposed more than a one day suspension in this case to achieve
the requisite impact and notice to the grievant that he was on the
brink of termination.
Accordingly, I shall give the grievant one final chance.
His discharge is reduced to a disciplinary suspension for the entire period since his termination.

He shall be reinstated without

back pay and expressly warned that future relevant violations will
result in his discharge.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of John Knight is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated without back pay and warned that future relevant violations, if
proved, will result in his discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October 16, 1986
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator, that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Donnie Brooks? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on September 24, 1986 at which time
Mr. Brooks, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
The grievant, a short term employee (hired in February
1986) was discharged for an unsatisfactory driving record, particularly his involvement in "four accidents" since completing
his probationary period in June 1986.
In my view, the pivotal evidence in this case is the testimony regarding the allegation that with passengers aboard the grievant "passed a stop sign" and "tailgated" an automobile in Co-op
City on August 13, 1986.
The testimony of supervisor Allen about this incident is
credible.

I find no reason why he should falsify what he saw and

what action he took.

He testified that he was off duty at the

time, in front of his house, and saw the grievant drive the bus
through a stop sign.

He testified that he saw the grievant then

tailgating a passenger car at a speed excessive for that location
in Co-op City.

He testified that he got into his own car, inter-

cepted the grievant and admonished him with the question "where

-2are you going driving like that!"
In response, the grievant's testimony is unacceptably
sparse.

He seemed to deny the incident occurred at all.

All he

said was that Allen's testimony was "not accurate."
I accept Allen's testimony as accurate, and the grievant's
denial as not only not believable but as evidence of his inability
or unwillingness to heed prior warnings about his driving and as
a failure to learn from the four day suspension imposed on him
only a month and a half earlier.
The aforesaid four day suspension was for "accidents"
of June 12, and June 29, which the Employer deemed "chargeable" or
"preventable."

That suspension was not grieved; hence the reasons

for it are no longer challengeable in this proceeding.
Following the suspension, in addition to the stop sign and
tailgating incident of August 13th, the grievant is charged with
"speeding on the property" on July 15th, an "accident with a van"
on August 25th, and a "short stop accident" on September 1st.
Without in this case deciding the import of the "chargeable" and/or "preventable" allegations involved, the Employer has
proved enough violations and infractions following the four day
suspension, especially the "stop-sign and tailgating" incident to
lead me to conclude that the grievant failed to heed the warning
and import of the four day suspension and that the Employer had
cause not to risk his continued employment.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
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There was just cause for the discharge of
Donnie Brooks.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October 16, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)SS':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case #1-85- 239
NYTel Case A-85-162

and
New York Telephone

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article 17.01 of
the collective bargaining agreement with
regard to the posting of Edwin Miller's
work schedule for the week ending March
9, 1985? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 25, 1986 at which time
Mr. Miller, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

I conclude that the Company's method of giving notice of
work schedules for day, evening and night shifts, was amateurish
and ambiguous, and could result in reasonable mistakes or wrong
notice to employees about a prospective work schedule.
of this failing and the resultant

Because

imprecision, I find that the

Company did not adequately comply with Article 17.01 of the contract .
However, I shall deny a remedy to the grievant because I
think he knew or should have known that the schedule posting as
he interpreted it had to be wrong; that he promptly learned what
his actual schedule was to be from a different posting; that based
on the unvaried practice of not making evening shift changes until
a prior schedule had been worked two weeks he should have known
that a "change" after one week had to be wrong or highly unusual
and that his two week wait after learning unquestionably what his
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schedule was to be before he claimed a contract breach,

suggests

some doubt or equivocation on his part regarding the accuracy or
sincerity of his position.

In short, I conclude the grievant did

not have the requisite "clean hands" to be entitled to a remedy.
The Company notes day, evening and night shift schedules
by coloring the schedule periods in white, green and red.

"White"

is a day shift; "green" denotes an evening shift and "red" a night
shift.

The Union's and grievant's claim is that the grievant's

posted schedule was "white."

The Company claims it was "green."

The claim is that a posting of a "white" schedule - which the
Union suggests was later changed to "green" was consequently

a

defective schedule posting under the contract.
My examination of what was offered as one copy of the
posting shows the ambiguousness and potential for confusion.
"green" on the grievant's schedule is a green shading.

The

While I

think it could be discerned as colored, I did not observe it as
it was posted, enclosed in a locked glass bulletin board. Significant, and not helpful to the Company's case is the fact that the
Company produced only the posting that was in the fifth floor
locker room, but could not produce the posting which was above the
foreman's desk on the sixth floor.

That omission lends some

evidentiary support to a conclusion that those who viewed either
or both of the two original postings may have seen "white" or
failed to see the"green shading," or that the posting at the two
locations may have been different.
Considering the testimony offered by the Union and the
tentativeness of the coloring used I am not prepared to
conclude that the grievant and the Union witnesses testified false
ly about what they saw and what they were told.
However the grievant must share the fault.

He knew that
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prior work assignments were for two weeks before a shift change
was scheduled.

He was working the evening shift for only a week;

so a change to days (with a "white" color notation) would have
been unprecedented.

When he learned a few days later from the

"meat schedule" (another but unofficial posting) that he was to
continue on the 4-12 shift, he had notice and should have reasonably inferred that the official posting was for, or was intended
to continue him for at least another week on the 4-12 shift.

Also,

he relied on what his steward and other employees told him the
official posting showed, without seeking authoritative clarification from management under circumstances where the seeking of
clarification was warranted.

Additionally, I fail to see why he

waited two weeks to grieve.

If he was convinced of the Company's

contract breach, and if had been damaged thereby, I believe he
would have complained earlier.

I am constrained to believe that

he had his doubts about any contract breach, and that in any event
he had not been damaged by any late or faulty notice.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
By the nature of the disputed work schedule
posting, and because of its lack of clarity
and potential for confusion, the Company
violated Article 17.01 of the contract with
regard to the posting of the work schedule
of Edwin Miller for the week ending March 9,
1985.
However, for reasons set forth in the above
Opinion, Mr. Miller is not entitled to a
remedy.

nAT-ipT^ r>
Too i n o r
DATED: December 22, 1986
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
oluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
North Babylon Teachers Association
and

Case No. 1739-0063-86

North Babylon UFSD

In the course of the hearing of the above matter, the
parties reached a settlement of the dispute.

That settle-

ment is made my AWARD, as follows:
Without conceding the Union's position
that the grievant filed for the 90% option
in timely fashion, and without establishing
a precedent for any other case and without
prejudice to the Board's position regarding
the time limits involved, and recognizing
that the facts in this case are unique and
do not involve any other employee, it is agreed that Peggy Askoff shall receive the
90% lump sum option, effective February 1,
1986.
A monetary adjustment between what she
has received as terminal leave pay and the
90% option payment shall be made to reimburse the Board for the terminal leave paymentimade since February 1, 1986.
It is understood that with the 90% option
payment to Ms. Askoff, the Board has no further
liability to Ms. Askoff.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 5, 1986
STATE OF New York ) S£. .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
oluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD

North Babylon Teachers Association

and

Case No. 1739-0063-86

North Babylon UFSD

In the course of the hearing of the above matter, the
parties reached a settlement of the dispute.

That settle-

ment is made my AWARD, as follows:
Without conceding the Union's position
that the grievant filed for the 90% option
in timely fashion, and without establishing
a precedent for any other case and without
prejudice to the Board's position regarding
the time limits involved, and recognizing
that the facts in this case are unique and
do not involve any other employee, it is agreed that Peggy Askoff shall receive the
90% lump sum option, effective February 1,
1986.
A monetary adjustment between what she
has received as terminal leave pay and the
90% option payment shall be made to reimburse the Board for the terminal leave payment made since February 1, 1986.
It is understood that with the 90% option
payment to Ms. Askoff, the Board has no further
liability to Ms. Askoff.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 5, 1986
STATE OF New York ) ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Maritime/Metal Trades Council

(M/MTC)

AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
FMCS #85K/29885

Panama Canal Commission

The stipulated issue is:
1. Is this dispute arbitrable?
2. Should Joseph W. Posey have been excluded
from the rotation policy? Should he have
been rotated out of his job?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Panama Canal Commission on December 13, 1985 at which time Mr. Posey, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the abovenamed Council
mission,
appeared.

(hereinafter referred to as the ''Union") and Com-

(hereinafter referred to as the Commission" or "Employer")
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

In accordance with the practices

and procedures of the Union and Commission, the arbitration hearing was tape recorded and the tapes were made available to the
Arbitrator as the official transcript of the proceedings.
The Union and Commission filed post-hearing memoranda which
were dated December 20, 1985 and which reached the Arbitrator on
December 23, 1985.

Under Section 8.19 of the collective bargain-

ing agreement, the Award in this matter is to be rendered by
January 22, 1986.
The Commission asserts that the grievance is not arbitrable
because the relief sought, namely the grievant's exemption from
the five year rotation policy and his reinstatement with back pay
are beyond the Arbitrator's authority and inconsistent with management's rights under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act.
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Also, it contends that any such remedy or relief would effectively
nullify the Commission's regulation regarding rotation which implemented a provision of the Treaty between the United States and
Panama and would thereby encroach on rights reserved to the
Commission under 5U.S.C. 7106(a).
The Commission confuses arbitrability with the merits of
the grievance.

It is well settled that a particular remedy sought

relates to the merits of a dispute.

It is the result or conse-

quence of a finding that the grievance is meritorious and hence
has nothing to do with the threshold question of whether the dispute is subject to adjudication as an alleged contract breach under
the collective bargaining agreement.
It is also equally well settled that a grievance is arbitrable if it bears a factual and reasonable relationship to a contract
provision, and is founded on a claim of a breach of that contract
clause(s).

A finding that the clause has not been violated or

that the grievance lacks factual or legal validity are matters
involving the merits of the dispute and do not determine arbitrability.

Indeed, though a particular remedy may be statutorily

barred does not mean that an arbitrator cannot find the grievance
to be contractually

sound and fashion a different remedy or no

remedy at all.
Here, the Commission's "five year rotation policy," is a
Commission "policy" and "regulation" within the contemplation and
meaning of Section 2.01 of the collective bargaining

agreement.

Said Section reads:
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND POLCIES. In the administration of all matters covered by this Agreement, Commission officials and employees are governed by existing or future
treaties, international agreements, laws,
and the regulations of appropriate authorities,
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including published Commission policies and
regulations in existence at the time the Agreement was approved; and by subsequently
published Commission policies and regulations
required by treaties, international agreements, laws, or by the regulations of appropriate authorities. All Commission rights,
functions, and prerogatives are retained by
and shall remain exclusively vested in the
Commission except as clearly and specifically limited by this Agreement.
(Underscoring supplied).
There is no dispute that the rotation policy is in written
form, and was in effect "at the time, the Agreement was approved."
Said policy was first issued on March 18, 1980.

I then read:

"United States citizen employees and other
non-Panamanian employees whose permanent
appointment occurred on or after October 1,
1979 to positions in the Commission in the
Republic of Panama shall be required to rotate out of their positions no later than
five years from the date they arrive at their
duty stations on the Isthmus."
The Administrator of the Canal Commission, permitted individual employees to be excluded from the rotation policy "for sound
administrative reasons."
in 1984.

The rotation policy was modified again

The provision concerning the granting of exceptions was

revised to permit exclusions from the rotation policy "only when
there are no qualified Panamanians available for the positions or
for other sound administrative reasons."
The foregoing policy was in response to and in implementation
of Article X Section 5 of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.
Treaty provision reads:
"The United States of America shall establish
a policy for the periodic rotation, at a maximum of every five years, of United States
citizen employees and other non-Panamanian
employees, hired after entry into force of this
Treaty. It is recognized that certain exceptions
to the said policy of rotation may be made for
sound administrative reasons, such as in the case
of employees holding positions requiring certain
non-transferable or non-recruitable skills."

The
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It is clear therefore, that the relevant parts of the Treaty
as legislated into a policy and regulation by the Commission, are
incorporated at least by reference into the collective bargaining
agreement.
The Union's claim is that the Commission's policy is an
erroneous interpretation and application of the Treaty provision;
that the Treaty, unlike the policy, makes no distinction between
permanent and temporary

employees; that the Commission's decision

to "rotate" and terminate the grievant after five years of service
because he was a temporary employee on the critical date was improper
because he was an "employee" of the Commission when the Treaty went
into effect and not "hired" thereafter; and that alternatively,
the policy and regulation has not been consistently and uniformly
applied to employees similarly situated to the grievant in that
many others were granted exemptions from the policy for family,
humanitarian and other grounds unrelated to "sound administrative
needs" or the availability of "qualified Panamanians" to replace
them.

Not to accord the same exemption to the grievant claims the

Union is to treat him in an unfair, disparate and discriminatory
manner.
In short, the Union is challenging the policy as an incorrect
reflection of the Treaty and is challenging the propriety of the
treatment of the grievant under the policy.

As such, the Union's

grievance alleges violations of the explicit and incorporated by
reference provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

Its

claims, factually and substantively, relate to contract provisions
and to terms and conditions of employment under the contract.

That

is enough to make the grievance arbitrable, irrespective of whether
or not the Union is contractually correct in its allegations and
regardless of whether or not an arbitrator could grant the remedy
the Union seeks if the Union's allegations are upheld.

Indeed,
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based on the foregoing, the contract definitions of a "grievance"
has been met.
Section 8.02, in pertinent part provides:
Grievance means any complaint by:
a. Any bargaining unit employee concerning any matter relating to the employment
of the employee;
b. The CR concerning any matter relating
to the employment of any bargaining unit
employee; or
c. Any bargaining unit employee, the CR,
or the Commission concerning:
(1) The effect or interpretation, or a
claim of breach, of this Agreement; or
(2) Any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law,
rule, or regulation affecting conditions
of employment.
Clearly, the Union's case herein involves claims "relating
to the employment of the employee;" "to the employment of any bargaining unit employee;" and "any claimed violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any law, rule or regulation affecting
conditions of employment" (emphasis added).
Having met the definition of a "grievance," the grievance is
subject to arbitration under Article 8 of the contract.
On the merits, the essential facts are not in dispute.

The

grievant was hired in June 1979 as a temporary security guard.

He

was still in temporary status when the Treaty went into effect.
Thereafter, on October 1, 1980, without any break in his employment, he was converted to permanent status.
transferred to the job time-and-leave clerk.

In June 1983 he
At the end of five

years of permanent employment, on October 1, 1985, he was terminated after his appeal for an exemption from the rotation policy
was denied by the Commission.

His appeal was denied because he

had become a permanent employee not before October 1, 1980; was
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thereby subject to the rotation policy; and was not eligible for
an exemption because his skills were not needed for sound administrative reasons and because a qualified Panamanian could be
recruited to replace him.
I am satisfied that I do not have the authority to decide
if the Commission's rotation policy was and is a proper reflection
of the relevant Treaty language.

For me to consider that question

requires a retroactive inquiry into the Commission's legislative
processes at a period of time several years before the beginning
of the instant collective bargaining relationship.
has no such retroactive authority.
is

The Arbitrator

His authority stems from and

limited to the provisions of the collective bargaining agree-

ment and to the relationship between the Union and the Commission
during that period.

Obviously therefore, he may not nullify a

Commission regulation or policy which had its legislative origins
years earlier, especially when that policy, as it existed, was incorporated by reference into the collective bargaining agreement
without change or challenge.
Rather, I must take the policy as written and applicable at
the time the collective agreement was first negotiated and I must
assume, with its unchanged inclusion by

reference in the contract,

that it was an acceptable and proper interpretation and implementation of the Treaty.

Had the Union thought otherwise it should

have negotiated a different provision

or a conditional application

of the policy when the contract was negotiated.

That it did not

means that the policy cannot now be challenged in arbitration as
an erroneous reflection of the Treaty.

In legal terms, the Union

is estopped from now complaining about a circumstance and policy
which it accepted and which became part of the
ation of Article 2 thereof.

contract by oper-

Therefore the Union's claim that the

Commission's policy improperly distinguishes between temporary and
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permanent employees, cannot be upheld in this proceeding.
It follows therefore that on its face and considering the
facts of the grievant's employment, the policy is squarely applicable to the grievant.

He was a temporary employee when the Treaty

went into effect, his job and skills were not so unique or irreplaceable by a Panamanian to warrant his exemption from the policy,
and he had served the maximum five years.
That he may have been promised permanent status and did
not achieve it until October 1, 1980 only because of a job freeze
are "non sequitors." The fact is that at the critical time he was
still a temporary employee.

The policy sets forth no reasons,

special circumstances or other conditions which would make one
temporary status different from another or which would exempt any
temporary employee from the rotation policy.

Even if I accepted

the grievant's testimony that he was promised permanent status
and that only a job freeze foreclosed it before the cut-off date,
I can find no contractual basis on which I could transform his
temporary status to a permanent status at the critical time.

It

is regrettable that the promise to make him permanent was not
carried out earlier, and it is unfortunate that a job freeze intervened.

But these circumstances are

nowhere contemplated or

recognized as exceptions to the policy.

For the Arbitrator to

recognize them as such would do violence to the restrictions of
Section 8.16h of the contract which require the Arbitrator to
"base his decision on this Agreement and applicable...regulation;"
and which caution him not to "add to, subtract from, or modify this
Agreement."
unambiguous.

In short, the policy or regulation is precise and
For it to be interpreted in a manner significantly

different than as written is to improperly go behind its clear and
unqualified language and to exceed arbitral authority.
Remaining is the allegation of inconsistent, unevenhanded
and discriminatory treatment of the grievant when compared to other
employees similarly situated who were granted exemptions from the
policy.
The Union's case is rejected, not because disparate
or in"
consistent application of the policy has not been
cause it has not been shown during the period

shown, but be-

probative to this

case.
The Union has shown a number of instances, similar to the
grievant, where non-essential or non-specially skilled employees
who were not permanent at the critical time were granted exemptions
for family, personal and/or humanitarian reasons.

But virtually

all of these predated the collective bargaining relationship and
the collective agreement.

They took place in the early and more

liberal years of the implementation of the Commission's policy,
and are not probative in this case.

It is not unusual for an em-

ployer to carry out policies in a loose, uneven or even discriminatory manner when there are

no collective bargaining restraints;

and then tighten those procedures and make the policy consistent
and uniform when and after the collective bargaining

relationship

is established.
The Arbitrator is confined to the period of the collective
bargaining relationship in making comparisons and judgments over
whether policies have been applied uniformly to employees similarly
situated.

If there is to be a finding of unfair comparative treat-

ment or discrimination, it can only be found by an Arbitrator within and against the backdrop of a collective agreement and a
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collective bargaining relationship.

Absent that bilateral arrange-

ment, inconsistencies are not actionable or challengeable, unless
violative of other external law, in which event it would be a
matter for some other forum.
What the Commission did before the contract with the Union
cannot be used now as a measurement of the contractual requirement
of consistency and evenhandedness.

What is probative and determ-

inative is whether the Commission's treatment of employees similarly situated was uniform, consistent and evenhanded during the time
that the collective bargaining relationship existed.
The evidence does not show inconsistent or disparate treatment subsequent to the effective date of the
ing agreement.

collective bargain-

The cases which the Union points to fall, for the

most part, in the years 1980, 1981 and 1982.

Indeed a major

circumstance, upon which the Union relies, namely where a group
of employees were granted exemptions, and some 16 or 17 others,
including the grievant, were found thereafter to be similarly
situated and were denied group

exemptions, but treated individually,

was decided by the Commission in March 1981, some two and one-half
years before the collective bargaining agreement went into effect.
For reasons already stated, I cannot find that precedential for the
grievant's complaint under the contract nor prejudicial to the
Commission's practices since the contract was negotiated.
Also, the case of the cook whom the Union claims was exempted
for reasons unrelated to the policy or the Treaty provision, was
decided by the Commission on August 9, 1983, a month before the
effective date of the contractual relationship.
Four situations on which decisional dates have been fixed,
postdate the contract.

They involve a Writer/Teacher, a Legal
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Technician, a Computer Equipment Analyst and a Pilot-in-Training.
The evidence on these cases in the record is sparse and hardly
determinative.

The burden is on the Union to show that these

exemptions involved circumstances similar to the grievant's request
and that

the Commission acted inconsistently and/or discrimina-

torily in granting those four and denying the grievant's appeal.
The burden has not been met.

The Union has not shown that the

four aforementioned employees were not retained because they
possessed skills not available or recruitable among Panamanians
and not retained for other sound administrative reasons.

Under

that circumstance I am not prepared to substitute my judgment for
that of the Commission on why those four employees (with job titles
indicating specialized skills) were granted exemptions.
The questions of whether on a total employment basis, before,
beyond and outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, these are or were circumstances where inconsistent, disparate
treatment or discrimination may be actionable, are not before me
and are not ruled on herein.

If there be any such circumstances,

they are for other forums, not arbitration.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The dispute is arbitrable.

2. Joseph W. Posey should not have been
excluded from the rotation policy. He
should have been rotated out of his job.

DATED: January 20, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
CJ CJ

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

•

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 1199E, NUHHCE,

AFL-CIO

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Hospital violate Section 1.2(a), 1.2
(b), of the agreement when it laid off Harry
Sherman on June 7, 1985? If so, what shall
be the remedy, if any.
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on April 3, 1986
at which time Mr. Sherman, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Hospital
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed post-hearing

briefs.
The pertinent contract section involved is Section 1.2(b)
which reads:
Bargaining Unit Work: Except for: emergencies;
excessive absenteeism; training, coaching and
instructing employees; inspecting; demonstrating,
testing and experimenting with equipment, materials, means, methods, supplies and techniques;
and securing and distributing equipment, material
and supplies; bargaining unit work shall not be
performed by a supervisory employee for more than
20% of his work time.
It is the Union's claim that when the grievant was laid off
from his job as a Stationary Engineer and forced to bump into the
lower graded job of Maintenance Mechanic II, his duties as a
Stationary Engineer were taken over and performed

by supervisory

employees on a regularly scheduled basis in excess of the 20%
limitation of Section 1.2(b) of the contract.
It must be noted that the contract does not prohibit the
performance of bargaining unit work by supervisors, but rather
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allows such activity not to exceed 20% of the supervisor's working
time plus other listed exceptions to the prohibition.

This 20%

allowance frustrates a portion of the Union's case herein.
I find that following the grievant!s layoff supervisory
employees stood watches previously performed by the grievant,
and that for a period of time from June 7, 1985 to October 5,
1985 the quantity and frequency of that

work, handled on a regu-

larly scheduled basis, exceeded the 20% allowance of Section 1.2
(b).

But for the period thereafter, the standing of watches and

other skilled maintenance work customarily handled by the grievant
or by the Stationary Engineer classification has not been shown
to exceed the allowed 20%.

For this latter period the evidence

is contradictory, off-setting and hence inconclusive.
Put another way, I am persuaded that some work, both watches
and skilled maintenance work normally performed by a Stationary
Engineer and more specifically performed by the grievant before
his layoff, were handled by the three supervisory employees identified in this case.

But after October 5, 1985, I cannot conclude

from the record that the quantity reached or exceed the 20% level.
This is not to say that it did not exceed that level, but
rather that the Union, with the burden of showing the contract
breaches by clear and convincing evidence, has not done so in
this record.
The logs relied on by the Union are not conclusive or
determinative.

They do not cover the full time periods alleged,

and I am unable to conclude that they are probatively representative of the entire period.

Rather, I must conclude that they

show what they have recorded for the specific dates attached to
each.

It is speculative that

other logs, if produced, would

show the same things, especially in view of contrary testimony
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by two of the supervisors involved.
The same obtains with regard to the quantitative nature
of what the logs state.

They are written in shorthand form,

and in the simplest terms refer to a job or piece of work without describing it in detail or its duration.

Hence, even assum-

ing that the work was regular bargaining unit work of the Stationary Engineer, I am unable to conclude that its quantity exceed
20% of the supervisor's time.
There is little doubt that the duties of other bargaining
unit personnel and the supervisors were adjusted to cover the
essential work vacated by the grievant's layoff.

But I cannot

tell from the record before me whether the new mix between bargaining unit and supervisory assignments created a factual
situation where the latter arrangement exceed the 20% limit.
Rather the record establishes the plausible conclusion that the
remaining bargaining unit Stationary Engineers took over work
vacated by the grievant, at the expense of other duties left unattended or under-attended, and even if the supervisors increased
their handling of what is normally work of the Stationary Engineer
they did not do so, in this record, beyond the 20% level.
Therefore, except for the period from June 7, 1985 to
October 5, 1985, where in my judgment the quantity

and regularity

exceeded the 20% level, the burden of showing a continued quantity
of bargaining unit work at or above that level, has

not been met.

My Award shallproyide for monetary damages to the grievant for
the former period.

The supervisory standing of watches during

that time, to cover for vacations or otherwise exceeded the 20%
level, and is not among the enumerated exceptions to that limit.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named

-4-

parties, makes the following AWARD:
Following the layoff of Harry Sherman on June
7, 1985, the Hospital violated Section 1.2(b)
of the contract for the period June 7, 1985 to
October 5, 1985, when supervisory employees
performed bargaining unit work of Stationary
Engineers in excess of 20% of their working
time.
Mr. Sherman shall be paid the difference between
what he would have been paid as a Stationary
Engineer and what he was paid as a Maintenance
Mechanic II for that period of time.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 11, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1199E, NUHCE, AFL-CIO

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance #1981-5145 dated December 23, 1983?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on August 6, 1985
at

which

Company

time
appeared

representatives
and were

of

afforded

the
full

above-named

Union

opportunity

to

and

offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and the Hospital

filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievance reads:
Complaint
"Mo1 Clarice Stephens upon transfering
from O.R. to Surgical Center as Instrument
Specialist was removed from the bargaining unit to non-bargaining."
Relief Sought
"The job that Mo' Stephens holds belongs
in the bargaining unit and should be placed
in the bargaining unit."
I find that the Union is correct in its assertion that significant duties performed by Ms. Stephens in the later

established

non-bargaining unit job of O.R. Technician/ Instrument Specialist,
she previously performed as a bargaining unit Nursing Assistant
and that those duties were also previously performed by at least
probably two other bargaining unit employees, also classified as
Nursing Assistants.
However, for two determinative reasons, I cannot conclude that
those duties, relating to disassembling and cleaning instruments,
are or were exclusively bargaining unit work.

And therefore I

cannot find that the Hospital erred in establishing the non-

-2bargaining unit job of O.R. Technician/Instrument Specialist to
presently perform these duties.
The first reason is that when performed by certain bargaining unit employees classified as Nursing Assistants those duties
were "out of classification" assignments because they were and
are not part of the job discription as regular job duties of a
Nursing Assistant.

That the two or three Nursing Assistants did

this work, when all others similarly classified performed patient
care duties consistent with the job description, does not constitute a sufficiently extensive variation in the job description
to make the disputed work of disassembling and cleaning instruments a regular or recognized part of the Nursing Assistant
portion.

Rather, the two or three different situations that dif-

ferred from the regular and prescribed duties of the other Nursing
Assistants and from the Nursing Assistant classification, consitute an exception to the bargaining unit work of Nursing
Assistants.
While this does not answer the question of whether the performance of the disputed work was or became,

as a consequence, regula

or acquired bargaining unit work (irrespective of classification),
it does not allow for a conclusion that that work is part of the
bargaining unit work of the bargaining unit classification, Nursing Assistant.
However, the remaining question is answered by the second
reason.
disputed

Based on the record, I conclude that at the time the
duties were being performed by Stephens and two or more

other bargaining unit employees classified as Nursing Assistants
the same work was or had been performed by at least one non-bargaining unit employee classified as an O.R. Technician-Instrument
specialist and by non-bargaining unit nurses, and that no prior
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That these examples may have taken place in hospital

locations other than where Stephens is presently assigned does
not persuade me that the work was significantly different.

On

the contrary, the evidence establishes that the disputed instrument disassembling and cleaning is substantially the same at the
different locations

involved.

In other words, the history of the performance of the disputed
work, as recited in the record before me, persuades me that at
least there has been mixed or joint performance of the duties by
non-bargaining unit and bargaining unit employees.

Therefore,

even if the Hospital's argument that the work all along is or
should have been a non-bargaining unit assignment and that its
performance by a few Nursing Assistants was an error or mis-assign
ment, the evidence of performance of the work by both bargaining
unit and non-bargaining unit employees negates the Union's claim
of bargaining unit exclusivity.

That being so, the Hospital had

the managerial right to structure the work as a non-bargaining
unit assignment, and that it is not presently assigned to or performed by a bargaining unit employee is not a contract violation.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance #1981-5145 dated
December 23, 1983, is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 11, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

E R I C J. S C H M E R T Z

P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK H55O
(516) S 6 O - 5 S 5 4

February 3, 1986

Irwin Bluestein, Esq.
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias
& Engelhard, P. C.
1501 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
Jonathan L. Sulds, Esq.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
9 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019
RE: Dispute of Trustees over
Locale of Trustee Meetings
Gentlemen:
I enclose to you each herewith, two duly executed
copies of my Award in the above matter.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hl
Encl.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Teachers

OPINION

AND

AWARD

#1739-0027 -86

and
Suffolk Child Development Center

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Center violate Article XXIII B of
the collective bargaining agreement when
it issued an amended Policy Manual? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on May 21, 1986 at which time represent1

atives of the above-named Association and Center appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The Center and the Association filed post-hearing briefs.

Article XXIII B of the contract reads:
The Center shall develop a written policy manual
during the term of this Agreement, which may be
amended from time to time. Where there is a direct conflict between such manual and this Agreement, this Agreement shall govern. When in the
development of the policy manual it becomes necessary to make changes in the terms and conditions
of employment not previously considered by the
parties, the Center and the Association will
negotiate in good faith and agree over such terms
and conditions of employment, but will implement
the remainder of the policy manual.
The Center developed a written policy manual in 1980 and an
amended manual in 1985.
The issue in this case is whether "home visits" by teachers
are discretionary or mandatory.

The Association claims that the

1980 policy manual provided for discretionary home visits; that
the amended manual made home visits mandatory; and that the change

-2constitutes a "change in terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of Article XXIIIB, requiring bilateral negotiations
The pertinent critical language of the 1980 manual read:
"In September, all teachers shall be requested
to make home visits to find out as much as
possible about the home environment of the
child and share short and long term goals with
the parents ..."
The pertinent critical language of the 1985 amended manual
reads:
"You are expected to contact the partents during the first weeks of school in order to introduce yourself and arrange an appointment for
a home visit..."
I am not persauded that the matter of "home visits" is a
term or condition of employment within the meaning of Article
XXIII B of the contract or under the applicable labor law.

Rather

I believe "home visits," standing alone, is a work assignment,
and absent some express contract prohibition or limitation on that
subject, has remained a managerial prerogative under the "educational policy" and "supervision and direction of the staff"
provisions of the Management Rights clause (Article VI) of the
contract.
However, assuming arguendo that there has been a change from
discretionary to mandatory home visits and that that subject is
a term and condition of employment, the Association's interpretation of Article XXIII B is nonetheless faulty.

The full pertin-

ent part of that contract clause requires bilateral negotiations
of changes in terms and conditions of employment "not previously
considered by the parties."
With that proviso, I need not decide whether the duty to
bargain applies only to changes effectuated by the development
of the original policy manual or whether it also covers later
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manual amendment.

Either way, the duty to negotiate is not just

for changes in terms and conditions of employment, but changes
"not previously considered by the parties."
Clearly the subject of "home visits" was previously considered by the parties.

It was included in the 1980 manual and was an

express provision in the Teachers Handbook in 1980 and in subsequent years.
Moreover, I am not persuaded that the 1980 manual language
is as "discretionary" as the Association alleges.

The phrase

"...teachers shall be requested to make home visits..." is at
least ambiguous in its discretionary
tent.

or mandatory meaning or in-

The use of the word "shall" can be logically and properly

construed to mean that the teachers "will" be so requested, and
thereby carries a mandatory tone.

If the word "requested" is

relied on to mean that home visits were at the discretionary
decision of the teachers, the ambiguity is clarified by the
parallel and subsequent teachers handbooks.

The 1980 handbook

stated:
"Remember you will be required to set up home
visits for each student in your class..."
(emphasis added)
As the subsequent annual handbooks repeated the foregoing
mandatory language, the ambiguous wording of the 1980 manual must
be resolved in favor of the Centers interpretation that "home
visits" have always been required.
With the foregoing conclusion, and regardless of whether
"home visits" are or are not a condition of employment, I find
that the 1985 amended manual made no substantive change in the
subject of "home visits," especially when the unambiguous mandator
language of the teacher handbooks was never complained about or
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grieved by the Association.

With the possible ambiguity of the

1980 manual so clarified, any past practice to the contrary
(under which teachers decided to make home visits on a discretionary basis) is immaterial in the face of the preeminent language
and meaning of the 1980 manual as clarified by the handbooks and
as codified in the 1985 manual.
Finally, the Association has not shown that mandatory "home
visits" would change the length of the work day or work week.

It

is a scheduled work assignment within the contractual work week.
Though it may require changes in the amounts of time devoted to
some activities such as reports and paper work, I cannot find that
it would add time to or change the times in and of the work day
and work week set forth in Article IX of the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Center did not violate Article XXIII B
of the collective bargaining agreement when
it issued an amended Policy Manual.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 16, 1986
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1730-0281-85

Local 393, U.M.U.A.
and
Suffolk County Water Authority
The stipulated issue is:

Has the Authority violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to assign overtime work to Jerry Bryant on March 2, 1985 and
April 27, 1985? If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association on November 14, 1986 at which time Mr. Bryant, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above named Union and Authority appeared.

All concerned were af-

forded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

Certain facts are not in dispute.

On the days in question,

namely the Saturdays of March 2 and April 27, 1985, the grievant
had less accumulated overtime than the employee who was assigned
the overtime work.

Also, it is stipulated that each time overtime

is assigned, supervision consults the overtime list to determine
for purposes of equalizing overtime, which employee had the least
accumulated overtime at that point.

And that such resort to the

overtime list was pursuant to Article XII Section 7 of the contract
and the overtime letter agreement of December 2, 1982 (Joint Exhibit 5).
It is also stipulated that the disputed overtime work on March
2 and April 27, 1985 was performed on preceeding week days by
Richard Baran, and that he continued on the assignment on an overtime basis on the Saturdays involved.

-2The Union claims that Baran's continuation on the two
Saturdays violated Article XII, Section 7 which reads:
Section 7. Overtime work in any department shall
be equalized among the departmental employees as
far as is practicable. Lists for overtime shall
be maintained by the department on a weekly basis
in a conspicuous place near work stations or time
clocks, and overtime status shall be based on hours
paid and not hours worked.
Procedures for equalization of overtime shall be in accordance with existing Memorandum of Agreement dated December 2, 1982.
and Article III Section A of the Memorandum of Agreement of
December 2, 1982 which reads:
A. Particular Work Project
1. When a particular work project requires continuity of work beyond the end of an employee's
workday, the employee or employees working on
such work project prior to the end of the workday shall be assigned to work the overtime required on said project on said day.
It is the Union's assertion that a work project that requires
"continuity" allows assignment of overtime work to the employee
regularly assigned to that project only for and at the end of that
particular workday, and does not allow a carryover to the next day
The Union points out that in the instant case, Baran was assigned
overtime not at the end of the regular workday

he performed work

on the project, but on a subsequent day, namely Saturday.
The Authority defends its assignment to Baran on the following grounds:
1. Both assignments involved work of a specialized
nature, about which Baran was more experienced and
knowledgeable.
2. For purposes of safety the project had to be
continued by the employee who had worked on it
during the week.
3. On April 29, the grievant was in East Hampton,
on an assignment which involved overtime that week,
and it was impracticable to bring him in from that
distance.
4. The contract does not require "equalization of

-3overtime" over short periods, so long as at the
end of the year the overtime has been equalized.
In the case of the grievant and Baran their overtime quantity at the end of 1985 was virtually
equal so that the letter and intent of the contract and Memorandum had been met.
5. To grant the grievant a monetary remedy would
unbalance the total 1985 overtime in the grievant 's favor.
6. The practice in the Department had been to
permit and carry out a continuity of assignment
from the regular workweek into overtime on a
subsequent day by the same employee.
The work on Saturday, March 2nd, involved completion of
electrical wiring in the engineering office.

The work on Saturday

April 27th, related to the detection and repair of trouble with a
sprinkler system at the Oakdale location.

I do not find that either

was an emergency that required the immediate or continuing attentic|n
of the employee who started the work on a previous workday.

Nor

do I find that either involved any special safety situation or
required any special experience or knowledge that a qualified
electrician did not possess or that a qualified electrician could
not handle or take over from a preceeding employee.

There is no

dispute that both the grievant and Baran are qualified to perform
this type of work.

It may have been more convenient or even more

efficient for Baran to continue with the job, but the contract does,
not provide for "continuity" for those purposes.
As to when equalization of overtime is to be done the Authority
conceded that it resorts to the overtime list each time an overtime
assigned is made, to see which qualified employee in the department
has the least accumulated overtime.

That means to me that an

effort at equalization is made with each overtime assignment.

There-

fore the cumulative overtime figures at the end of 1985 are immaterial even if unbalanced by a decision in the grievant's favor.
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What is material is where the grievant and Baran stood on March
2nd and April 27th.

On those days, the grievant had less overtime

than Baran.
I am not persuaded that the grievant's location in East
Hampton made it impracticable to assign him the overtime.

The

facts indicate that the Authority knew in advance of the need for
Saturday work on the sprinkler system.

Baran had inspected it

previously, preliminary to the Saturday work.

With that amount of

notice, the grievant could have been brought in from East Hampton.
I find the contract language to be clear and unconditional.
Article III Section A of the Memorandum of Agreement specifically
limits the assignment of overtime to the employee working on a
project when "continuity" is required, to the end of that employee's
workday.

It does not provide for "continuity" by the same employee

on a subsequent overtime day, nor does it provide exceptions for
efficiency, safety or other operational conveniences.

Therefore,

based on the express language of the Memorandum, the Authority's
assignment of the Saturday overtime work to Baran when the grievant 's accumulated overtime was less was in violation of the language of the Agreement.
What remains is the assertion and evidence that in the particular department involved there has been a practice to schedule
overtime on a subsequent day for the same employee who was working
on the project during the regular workweek, and that this practice
evolved from an incident in early 1960 when a serious electrical
accident occurred at a pump station at Hauppauge.

The Authority

asserts that as a consequence and for reasons of safety, it required the employee who made the electrical installation to be the
one to return to turn it on, and that a change on an overtime day
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to other personnel less experienced with the particular installation was unsafe.
It is well settled that a practice contrary to unambiguous
contract terms cannot prevail.

Hence, in the face of the clear

language of Article III Section 7 of the Memorandum, the practice
of this particular department must give way to what the contract
provides.

Moreover, while I appreciate the safety concerns of the

Authority, I do not find that the particular work dispute in this
case, namely wiring in the engineering office and repair of a
sprinkler system involved the type of danger or potential danger
that attended the 460 volt junction box at the pump station in
Hauppauge in 1960.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Authority violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to assign overtime to
Jerry Bryant on March 2, 1985 and April 27,
1985.
The Authority shall make a monetary payment
to Bryant equivalent to the amount he would
have earned had be been assigned that overtime .

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 3, 1986
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture

Laboratory

Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Technicolor, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Has the Employer violated Sections 7, 13
or 17 of the collective bargaining agreement on or about May 6, 1986 resulting in
the layoff of Louise Chirichella? If so
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 1, 1986 at which time Ms.
Chirichella, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The record clearly establishes that the work of "notching" and "writing numbers and notations" has been a regular duty
performed by the Timers as well as the Timer/Clerk.

Though the

Timer/Clerk does only this work, it has not been work exclusive
to her classification.

On the night shift where there has never

been a Timer/Clerk, the "notching" and "recording of numbers"
has always been done by the night shift Timers as part of their
regular functions.

On the day shift, the Timers have regularly

performed those duties as well, but because until recently they
were busy with other regular duties of the Timer classification,
some of the "notching" work and the recording of numbers has been
handled as well on a full-time basis by the Timer/Clerk.
The Employer has shown a substantial reduction in its
business and production, and specifically a substantial reduction
in Timer's work.

Indeed, the complement of

duced to two on days, and two on nights.

Timers has been re-

With the drop in work,
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the Timers are able now to handle all the "notching" and "number
recording" required of and attendant to their Timer job.

The

work of the Timer/Clerk, as an adjunct to the Timers on the day
shift, is no longer needed.

The Employer has shown that there

is not enough "notching" and/or "number recording" work to keep
a Timer/Clerk fully or substantially occupied.

In fact, recently,

while one day shift Timer has been away, all the available Timer
work, including the "notching" and "number recording" has been
adequately handled by a single day shift Timer.
Accordingly I find that the grievant was properly laid
off for lack of work under Section 7 of the contract, and that
her layoff did not violate Sections 13 or 17.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the contract
in the layoff of Louise Chirichella.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: July 7, 1986
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E,

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Technicolor, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Robert DiBari? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 19, 1986 at which time Mr.
DiBari, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharged for unsatisfactory attendance,
following the progressive discipline steps of warnings and suspension .
There is no question about the unsatisfactory nature of
the grievant's record.

In 1985 he was absent twenty-six days and

his pattern of absenteeism continued following a seven day suspension that year.

In 1986, up to his discharge in November, he

had been absent fifteen days, many of which followed a warning.
Particularly objectionable to the Employer has been the
grievant's pattern of "taking long weekends" by staying out on
Mondays or Fridays and by "extending" holidays.

The Employer find

this particularly burdensome because with many employees on layoff
due to difficult economic conditions for the industry, the grievant 's absences on the busy days of Monday and Fridays taxes the
available personnel and often requires a supervisor to fill in
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(the grievant's job was as a can carrier).

The latter generates

Union complaints.
Based on the record I conclude that the grievant's record,
especially comparing 1986 with 1985 shows improvement and that with
ten permitted days off under the contract (seven sick days and
three personal leave days) the grievant's fifteen absences in 1986
constitute an unacceptable record. But it is not so bad (i.e. five
more than contractually permitted) as to justify his discharge,
particularly in view of the fact that he was not fired following
his 1985 suspension but warned again in 1986, thereby restarting
the progressive discipline cycle.
Apparently, moreover, the grievant did not hide the fact
that he took extended weekends to stay with his elderly mother on
Long Island, particularly after his brother's death.

Though he

was wrong in doing so, I am constrained to believe that he may
have thought that with notice to the Employer (usually towards the
end of the weekend) it was all right or excused.
Under the foregoing circumstance I think it proper and
appropriate that the grievant be given one final chance to maintain a satisfactory attendance record.

He should be disciplined

1

by a suspension, and he is expressly warned that he will be subject to discharge if his attendance record does not improve forthwith to a satisfactory level and that it be so maintained.
Additionally, I shall enjoin him from taking extended
weekends or holidays to stay with his mother.

As understandable

as his desire to do so may be, he will just have to make other
arrangements.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:

o

The discharge of Robert DiBari is reduced
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated
without back pay and the period of time
between his discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for his unsatisfactory attendance
record. DiBari is warned that this is
his final change. If his absenteeism
record continues unsatisfactory, he shall
be subject to discharge. Additionally,
he is enjoined from taking extended
weekends or extended holidays to visit
and stay with his mother.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 22, 1986
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

ERIC J. S C H M E R T Z

P.C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK II55O
(SIS) 5 6 O - 5 8 5 4

February 3, 1986

Everitt E. Lewis, Esq.
Lewis, Greenwald, Kennedy
& Lewis, P. C.
232 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
Bonnie Glatzer, Esq.
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather
& Geraldson
520 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
RE: Local 702 -and- Technicolor
Kitz Arbitration
Dear Mr. Lewis and Ms. Glatzer:
You have submitted to me, respectively, letters dated
December 23, 1985 and January 2, 1986 in which you set forth certain
disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of my
Award of November 18, 1985. You have asked me for clarification of
the Award and/or determinations on the disagreements.
To the extent that I am able, considering the scope of what
was presented to me in the arbitration, I do so as follows:
1. Had Mr. Kitz been actively employed following
his "hire," he would have begun work on September
20, 1985. I assume he would have completed the
temporary assignment on November 22, 1985 and that
Mr. Goldstein v/orked longer only because he started
later.
Therefore payment to Kitz for the period September
20, 1985 to November 22, 1985 was proper.
2. There was nothing in the record before me showing
how many days Kitz attended Trustee meetings and
negotiation sessions. Your respective letters are not
of evidentiary value on this point, nor is the letter
of November 22, 1985 from Mr. Norman Stein.
What is important is not how many meetings he attended, but for how many of those meetings or negotiations
he was paid. On this point, and in the absence of any
other probative evidence, I accept Kitz's affidavit
under oath that he was paid for only six such meetings
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and negotiations. Therefore, six days should
have been deducted from the payment to him that
my Award ordered. The Company shall make the
adjustment.
3. The question of deduction or non-deduction
of unemployment insurance also was not presented
to rne or argued at the arbitration hearing. But
it is relevent to the damages I directed. Had I
been asked to rule on that matter in my Award, I
would have directed the Company not to deduct unemployment insurance, but rather to notify the unemployment insurance department of the arbitration
Award, and request that department to recoup the
appropriate amount of insurance payments from Kitz,
and to adjust the Company's experience rating accordingly. As this has been my consistent practice in
back pay situations in which I am asked to rule on
the unemployment insurance question, I make that
practice my ruling in this case. The Company shall
restore the amount of deducted unemployment insurance
to Kitz's payment.
4. No requests for pro-rata vacation pay or for
two weeks wages in lieu of notice of layoff were
requested in the arbitration For that reason and
because I am not persuaded that a planned, short
period of employment to cover work on a temporary
basis carries with it any right to pro-rata vacation
or pay in lieu of notice of layoff, the Union's requests for these two benefits are denied.
5. The tax deductions made by the Company were not
improper and may stand.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJSrhl

PILOT'S SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Airline Pilots' Association

and

A W A R D
ALPA Case No. NY-80-85

Trans World Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Pilots' System Board
of Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
TWA had just and sufficient cause for discharging C. W. Handley for reasons assigned in Captain E. J. Stroschein's letter
dated November 15, 1985.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: November 26, 1986
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) " "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

W. J. Moran
Concurring
DATED: November
1986
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) ° " °
I, W. J. Moran do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

J. G. Colpitts
Concurring
DATED: November
1986
STATE OF New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, J. G. Colpitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.
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D. H. Brown
Dissenting
DATED: November
1986
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York) ° " "
I, D. H. Brown do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

P. Sedlak
Dissenting
DATED: November
1986
STATE OF New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, P. Sedlak do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the indiv idual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Airline Pilots' Association

^

and

CHAIRMM

Trans World Airlines
In accordance with the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement between Airline Pilots' Association,
hereinafter referred to as "ALPA" or the "Union," and Trans World
Airlines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "TWA" or the "Company,"
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a System Board of
Adjustment to hear and decide together

with the ALPA and TWA

designated members of said Board the following stipulated issue:
Whether or not TWA had just and sufficient
cause for discharging C. W. Handley for
reasons assigned in Captain E. J. Stroschein's
letter dated November 15, 1985.
Captains D. H. Brown and P. Sedlak served as the ALPA designated Board members and Captains W. J. Moran and J. G. Colpitts
served as the TWA designated Board members.
Hearings were held in London, England on June 18, 19 and 20,
1986 at which time Mr. Handley, hereinafter referred to as "Handleyj"
or as the "grievant" and representatives of ALPA and TWA appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
the Arbitrators

was waived.

The Oath of

A stenographic record was taken.

Each side filed a post-hearing brief and A1PA submitted additional
material concerning a pending law suit, to which TWA responded.
Following receipt of the aforesaid briefs and material The
Board met in executive session.
ISSUE
In a November 15, 1985 letter of termination addressed to the
grievant, Handley, TWA made five charges upon which it based its
dismissal of Handley as a pilot.

The charges were that Handley:
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(1) October 26, 1984 failed to protect TWA Flight #703 to
which he was assigned as First Officer, thereby causing major disruption of the operation;
(2) consumed wine and beer while on layover, thereby violating flight operation policy,
(3) failed to prepare mentally and physically for flight
duty;
(4) subjected TWA to adverse publicity by virtue of his
behavior; and
(5) failed to notify TWA in a timely manner of his inability
to cover the flight, thereby denying TWA the ability to effect the
most efficient recovery of the operation.
FACTS
Handley, a TWA employee for 20 years with no prior adverse
disciplinary record, was dismissed by TWA on November 15, 1984
for the reasons stated in the previously described letter.

The

basis for dismissal arose out of an event which occurred during
the evening of October 25 and the morning of October 26,

1984.

On the afternoon of October 25, 1984, Handley arrived in London
having served as First Officer on flights from London to Copenhagen
to London.

He was on layover in London, assigned to serve as

First Officer on Flight #703 from London to New York, scheduled
to depart Heathrow at 12 noon on October 26. He did not report for
duty.

TWA cancelled the flight and made other arrangements to

handle the passengers.

The circumstances of his failure to report

and the cancellation of the flight constitute the gravamen

of the

offense TWA relied on to terminate Handley's employment.
Handley arrived at the Kensington Hotel at about 2:00 P.M.
on layover upon his return to London from Copenhagen awaiting his
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departure Flight #703 on October 26 to New York.

At about

7:30

P.M. on October 25 Handley and one Paul Martin, another TWA employee who has since resigned, went to a pub, the Duke of Clarence
where he had two pints of beer.
Topo D'Oro, a London restaurant.

At about 9:00 P.M. they went to
At dinner, according to Handley,

he and Martin shared two bottles of wine and Handley had two
brandies.

According to Handley, on their way out of the restaurant

after dinner, they went to the bathroom in the restaurant.

When

they emerged, they discovered that everyone was gone, the restaurant was closed and they were locked in the restaurant.

At the

hearing Handley claimed they were leaving the restaurant sometime
after midnight and were in the bathroom only about five minutes;
although he admitted that on two earlier occasions he had told TWA
that he had gone to the bathroom at 10:30 P.M.

He claimed that his

earlier versions were false and were made in order to place his
situation in a better light.
When he actually went to the bathroom and how long he remained there is in dispute.
Upon discovering they were locked in, Handley said they tried
unsuccessfully to find keys and to force the doors.

They called

the police at 1:41 A.M. and a passerby made a second call at 1:58
A.M.

Some officers arrived at the restaurant at 2:00 A.M.

During

the course of the morning hours the police were there on two
occasions.

The police described Martin, Handley's companion, as

very drunk, very vocal and hostile.

Handley was described by the

police as quiet and apparently trying to quiet his companion, but
also very intoxicated.

For the most part Handley was not in the

sight of the officers and appeared to them to be trying to avoid
being seen.
Handley and Martin refused the police offer to break in the
door which was conditioned on their being financially accountable
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for the damage this would cause.

The police finally located the

owner and Handley and Martin were released from the restaurant
at 7:15 A.M.

In the interim, Handley admitted that he had two

additional brandies.

Both emerged from the restaurant appearing

to the police to be very intoxicated.

They were similarly de-

scribed by Mr. Rubin, a Kensington employee, when they arrived at
the Kensington.

On arrival, they went to bed.

Prior to that time and while in the restaurant, at the
suggestion of Mr. Rubin, they concluded he sould contact TWA.
This conversation took place shortly after 5:00 A.M. when Rubin
called them at the restaurant.

Rubin contacted TWA and TWA em-

ployees contacted the police and the restaurant.

TWA authorized

the breaking of the door, although this proved to be unnecessary.
TWA also ascertained from Martin and Handley they were unfit to
fly.

The flight was cancelled and arrangements made to place the

passengers on another flight.
affected other flights.

These arrangements were complex and

Handley claimed they did not try to con-

tact TWA Heathrow operations because they thought it was closed.
In fact however, it was open 24 hours.

Their earlier attempt, at

about 3:00 A.M. to contact the Flight #703 captain through the
hotel employee, Rubin, also failed because when he called the
Captain's hotel room at about 3:00 A.M. there was no answer.
TWA introduced copies of newspaper articles which reported
the flight cancellation and the disposition of the passengers.
The article also referred to Handley and Martin's experience but
only in terms of having been locked in the restaurant overnight.
DISCUSSION
ALPA's responses to the five reasons relied on by TWA for
discharging Handley are (Union Br. 7~9):
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Reason #1: It concedes that Handley failed to protect his
assigned flight, but claims there are mitigating circumstances and
denies that the cancellation resulting from Handley's failure to
fly Flight #703 caused a major disruption.

According to ALPA, if

there was a disruption it was not due to TWA's inability to find
a replacement for Martin and Handley and, in any event, TWA suffered no financial loss from the cancellation.

Mitigation of the

charge, according to ALPA consists of the fact that Handley and
Martin were accidentally locked in the restaurant overnight and
this is not attributable to their drinking.

Further, ALPA urges,

the fact that Handley recognized early in the morning of October
26, that he was not mentally and physically fit to fly also is a
mitigating

factor.

Reason #2: The Union concedes Handley violated TWA's rule
against consuming alcohol while on layover, but claims that TWA's
discharge of Handley is inconsistent with TWA's past practice in
similar cases and thereby Handley has been denied even-handed
treatment.
Reason #3: The Union concedes Handley failed to prepare himself mentally and physically for flight duty but asserts the
mitigating circumstances claimed in response to #1, supra.
Reason #4: The Union concedes there was publicity concerning
the cancellation, but denies it was adverse and if it was adverse
TWA failed to show it suffered any harm or loss as a consequence.
Reason #5: As for the failure to advise TWA in a timely
manner and denying it the opportunity to recover the flight, the
Union denies any fault on the part of Handley for failing to advise operations before 5:00 A.M. and claims that TWA was advised
as soon as practicable after Handley realized his physical and
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mental condition.

The Union also claims that it was not the timing

I
of the notification to TWA that prevented the recovery of the flight,
but it was the absence of replacement pilots which caused the
cancellation.
Finally, the Union points to Handley's twenty years of unblemished service as a mitigating factor and claims that Handley
is the victim of a discriminatory application of TWA's disciplinary policy.

According to the Union, "the Company, in the past,

has not disciplined as harshly, other similarly situated pilots
who have violated the Company's drinking regulations in the same
or in a more aggravated manner as Handley." (Union Br. 9)
After considering the contentions of the parties, I have
concluded that the only significant issues to be resolved are
whether the circumstances are such that they should be viewed as
mitigatingHandley's violations and whether TWA's discharge of
Handley constituted discriminatory application of TWA's disciplinary policy.
(1)

These two issues remain after concluding that:
Handley failed to protect his assigned flight, as the

Union concedes, and that the cancellation of the flight was itself
a disruption of the operation.

And that combined with the need to

shuffle passengers and other flights became a major disruption.
The Union concedes the cancellation was the "result" of Handley's
failure to fly Flight #703.

Thus it fairly can be said that a

major disruption of operations was Handley's conduct.

The Union's

claim that TWA suffered no revenue loss is irrelevant, because
proof of revenue loss is not necessary to sustain the charge of
disrupting operations.

In any event, there was sufficient evidence

to establish there was a financial loss.
(2) The Union conceded that the prohibition on drinking on
layovers was violated.

I find that Handley drank to excess before

being locked in the restaurant and continued thereafter, and was
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intoxicated.

The issue of penalty is all that remains on this

charge.
(3)

Similarly, only the question of penalty remains in view

of the admission

Handley failed to prepare himself mentally and

physically for the flight.
(4)

As for the claim of adverse publicity, I conclude that

there was publicity but the content of the newspaper stories was
such that they were not so adverse on their face as

to warrant an

inference that the publicity was adverse without further evidence
that TWA was harmed.

There was none presented by TWA other than

Captain Stroschein's conclusion

that it was adverse to TWA's image

of providing reliable schedule fulfillment and his admission that
he knew of no actual harm or loss suffered by TWA.
(5) The charge that Handley failed to notify TWA in a timely
manner of his predicament and that this denied TWA the opportunity
to recover the flight is not sustained by the evidence.

Handley

concedes that no effort to contact TWA operations were made until
sometime after 5:00 A.M.

When TWA was contacted it was by Rubin

the hotel employee and he contacted TWA only after he initiated
the suggestion to Handley that TWA be contacted.

Handley's ex-

planation for not contacting TWA is that he was unaware TWA operations was open during the night.

However, the evidence shows it

was open and this fact appeared in a manual which employees were
charged to consult.

The record supports the conclusion that not-

withstanding an abortive attempt to advise Captain Lowrey of their
predicament, they delayed contacting TWA because of their condition
Hence, there was not timely notice given to TWA,
But this is not the end of the inquiry.

The charge is not

simply a failure to give timely notice but also that the failure
caused a result; i.e., TWA was denied the opportunity to recover
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the flight.

The Union claims that the failure to recover the

flight is attributable to TWA's lack of available pilots and not
to the failure to give timely notice.

In any event, to sustain

the charge TWA was required to show that the flight would have been
or at least likely could have been recovered if it had received
earlier notice.

TWA failed to establish at what point notice

should have been given so that TWA could have

recovered the flight

Consequently, I conclude there was a failure of proof on this full
charge.
I now turn to those factors upon which the Union relies as
mitigating

the violations charged in 1 and 3: the failure to pro-

tect Flight #703 and the failure to properly prepare mentally and
physically for flight duty.

The mitigating factors specifically

relied on by the Union are (1) the fact Handley was accidentally
locked in the restaurant overnight and that this was not attributable to his drinking and (2) that he

removed himself from the

Flight #703 when he realized that his physical and mental condition prevent from flying safely.
I conclude that neither of these constitute mitigating
factors.

Indeed to recognize these as mitigating factors would

swallow up the charges to which they are addressed.

The facts are

that Handley voluntarily drank alcohol and each of the witnesses
who observed him testified that he was quite intoxicated.

As a

violation of TWA's rule against drinking while on layover, and
considering the quantity of alcohol which the grievant admits he
consumed before and after he was locked in the restaurant, I conclude that his resultant condition affected his ability to fly
Flight #703 at 12 noon the next day.
Aside from the fact that the grievant changed his position
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regarding when he went to the bathroom and when he tried to leave
the restaurant, which I do consider relevant on the matter of his
credibility, the actual hours are unimportant in deciding the basic
issue presented.
Based on Handley's change of position at the hearing, I am
constrained to believe that the restaurant closed at about 1:30
A.M.

It is significant that

his statement at the hearing that he

went to the bathroom sometime after midnight was made after he had
received information from a restaurant employee that the restaurant closed at 1:30 A.M.

Hence his position at the hearing would

place him even in a better light than his earlier statement fixing
the time at 10:30 P.M.

By his admission and changed position, it

is logical to conclude that about 1:30 A.M. was the time the restaurant closed.
But the critical fact is that after finding himself locked
in and without any idea whether he would get out shortly or not,
he further compounded his violation of the Company's rule by drinking some more.

If he ever thought that he was or would be able to

make his flight, he made that impossible under any reasonable test
by consuming more liquor.

Whether objectively true or not, if he

believed he was capable of meeting his flight schedule at the time
he found himself locked in, he would have and should have consumed
no more alcohol regardless of when the authorities or the restaurand owner got him out.
That he did not, I consider an act of manifest and continued
irresponsibility, irrespective of when and how he got locked in,
and to my mind is evidence of his realization that

at the time

he found himself locked in he was already intoxicated and unfit
to fly at the upcoming noon hour.
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His own misconduct of putting himself in an unfit condition
and the exacerbation of that condition after finding himself locked in, cannot now be used as a defense to or mitigation of the
charges against him.

He was unfit before he was locked in, so

the locked restaurant cannot be an acceptable defense.

That he

believed he would have been fit to fly if he hadn't been locked
in is not a defense either, because, not knowing that he wouldn't
get out shortly, he drank more alcohol, assuring his continued unfitness no matter when he was extricated.
Indeed that he was locked in, after consuming a large quantity
of alcohol inside of 24 hours of his scheduled flight may have beer
fortunate "in the public interest," because it precluded his plan
to fly under conditions that I think would have been precarious
and unacceptable.
As an additional mitigating factor applicable to all the
charges, the Union points to Handley's unblemished twenty year
record of service with TWA.

I conclude that this is to be weighed

by TWA in the first instance, and I find that TWA did take it into
account when it decided on the penalty of discharge.
It is well settled that where misconduct standing alone justifies dismissal, it is for the employer, not the arbitrator to
mitigate the penalty because of a prior clear record.
Here the evidence establishes that Handley was guilty of the
violations charged in items 1, 2 and 3, and those violations under
the Company's rules and under the circumstances presented, constitute cause for discharge, his prior record notwithstanding,
unless it can be shown that dismissing Handley was an act of
discriminatory enforcement of TWA policy.
I conclude that it was not discriminatory

or unevenhanded.

-11TWA's rule provides:
Use of Intoxicants
a. Use of intoxicants, including wines and
beer, while on duty or within a 24-hour
period prior to assigned schedule or
frequenting places, other than restaurants,
where intoxicants are sold, while in uniform or on duty is prohibited.
b. Admission to the cockpit is prohibited
to any person following use of intoxicants. Flight crew members proceeding
to or from a flight assignment in uniform are not to be served intoxicating
beverages.
c. Any violation of above regulations will
be cause for immediate dismissal.
The rule is not challenged, and consequently it concededly
applies to Handley.

He violated the rule by drinking alcohol while

on layover and the rule explicitly authorizes dismissal.

The Union

has suggested that there is a pattern of non-enforcement of the
rule or at least a pattern of no imposition of the penalty of
dismissal where there has been an isolated social drink (usually
at dinner) although that conduct would come within the terms of
the rule.

I need not decide that question because this clearly

is not a case of that nature.

Handley drank a quart of beer, a

bottle of wine and four brandies by his own admission.

This is

not the social drink at dinner.
For its claim of discriminatory enforcement, the Union relies
on several instances in which dismissal was not invoked by TWA.
After examining those cases as well as others presented by TWA and
the Union, I conclude that TWA did not have a prior policy of not
dismissing those who broke the "layover" rule which was reflected
in uniformly imposing a lesser sanction.
The Union and TWA cite cases or instances which support their
respective positions on the claim of discriminatory enforcement.
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The simple fact is that the discipline in each case was imposed
on the basis of the specific facts in those cases.

There is no

uniform imposition either of discharge or a lesser sanction in
every case.

Consequently, it is necessary to know the specific

facts of those cases in order to determine the common thread, if
any, in deciding to impose sanctions.

Thus, where sanctions less

than dismissal have been imposed, some of the employees have been
alcoholics, but some have not been alcoholics (Brennan,Leach). In
one instance, the employee had an alcohol problem and violated the
24 hour rule, TWA discharged him, but the arbitrator reduced the
penalty to a suspension on the grounds it was the first time there
had been a discharge for a violation of the 24 hour rule when the
employee's work had not been affected (Exum).

In this regard, I

view TWA's act of discharging Exum, the employee, as an expression
of TWA's disciplinary policy.

I am not bound by that arbitrator's

decision on the question of what is TWA policy.

In any event,

Exum can be distinguished because I find that Handley's act of
totally disabling himself from the performance of his duties surely was work-related.
In other cases, discharge was upheld where the employee engaged in egregious conduct which prevented him from reporting to
work or where he did report for work while intoxicated (Bolsenga,
Mollohan, Matterson).

In one instance, Young, cited by the Union,

we do not know what discipline was imposed because that decision
was to be affected by a medical examination and the results are
not in the record.

In some cases, the employee was not discharged

when he expressed remorse and clearly understood the gravity of
violating the relevant rule. (Leach).
The case closest to Handley's is that of Bolsenga, where as
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a consequence of intoxication, the employee failed to report for
duty.

Bolsenga who was not an alcoholic, was jailed during his

ill-fated drinking bout.

His claim that he failed to report to

duty because he was in jail and not because he was drinking was
rejected.

The only certain conclusion that can be drawn from

the cases is that there has not been a consistent TWA policy not
to discharge personnel who violate the 24 hour - layover rules,
but rather the decisions have been mixed and obviously made on
the special facts of each case.
I believe this is permissible and TWA's decision to discharge
Handley should be upheld if TWA establishes just cause and its
determination to discharge Handley is not the product of mere whim
or caprice or the consequence of relying on some invidiously discrminatory

factor.

There has been no claim and certainly no evi-

dence that TWA relied on an invidiously discriminatory factor to
discharge Handley.

The basic facts it relied on were (1) Handley

drank to the point of disabling himself from flying, (2) any
drinking at all while on layover violated a clear unambiguous well-known written company rule; (3) TWA operations were disrupted as
a direct result of Handley's conduct and (4) he compounded his own
unfitness when a dilemma in which he found himself called for different conduct.

At the hearing it further appeared that Handley had

been less than truthful in two pre~hearing statements or in his
sworn hearing testimony.

Further and importantly it appeared that

he did not fully appreciate the importance of complying with the
layover rule.

Handley said he believed that with a good night's

rest his drinking a bottle of wine, 2 brandies and a quart of beer
would not affect his ability to perform the next day.

The fact is

that this is not and was not his decision to make and his attitude
certainly did not work in his favor or towards mitigation.

His

-14-

obligation was to comply with a rule designed to help insure the
safety of the aircraft and the passengers who placed their trust
in TWA.

In assuring that there was compliance with its rule, TWA

was acting reasonably within its own management prerogatives and
in the public interest.
Under these circumstances, no matter how sympathetic the
Arbitrator may be over the grievant's plight after twenty years
of apparently faithful and capable service, he may not substitute
his judgment on the penalty imposed for that of TWA, unless the
Company's judgment was violative of the contract, violative of a
consistent past practice or arbitrary or capricious.

None of

these limits are present in this case.
The discharge of Mr. Handley was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: November 26, 1986

In the Matter of the Dispute
between
The Union and Employer Trustees
of the Local 144 - Southern New
York Pension and Welfare Funds

AWARD

The stipulated issue is:
Unless there is mutual agreement of the
Trustees, what shall be the locale of
Trustee meetings?
A hearing was held on January 23, 1986 at which time representatives of the Union and Employer Trustees appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
In my Award of September 26, 1985, I ruled that the office
of the Funds shall be at 240 West 35th Street, New York City.
An office for the Funds is established at that location,
and, as the parties were advised the Arbitrator visited that
office on January 27, 1986, to observe its location and its
facilities for the holding of Trustee meetings.
For various reasons including its location in the heart of
the garment center, parking difficulties, inaccessibility for the
Union members, and the smallness of the conference room, the Union
Trustees object to holding Trustee meetings at that location.
The Employer Trustees assert that the appropriate place for
Trustee meetings is at the office of the Funds; that information
needed by the Trustees in the course of those meetings is available only at that office; that the size of the office and the
conference area is adequate to accommodate the Trustees; that
the parking and/or accessibility is no more difficult than at any
other busy section of New York.
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When I rendered my Award of September 26, 1985, I ruled
that the Funds office be at 240 West 35th Street not just because the office was by then in existence at that location,
but primarily because, in my view, it was the only
location presented to me by the parties.

"neutral"

And I concluded that

the office of the Funds should be at a neutral location, unless
the parties agreed otherwise.
However, I am not persuaded that the same principle of a
"neutral" location need apply to meetings of the Trustees.

Real-

istically, the Trustees are often partisan and adversary, whereas
the Fund administrator, staff and office location should be nonpartisan and neutral.

The personnel of the office are employees

of The Funds and the Trustees; are responsible for the impartial
implementation of Trustee policies and decisions. The records and
files of the Funds enjoy the same neutrality, objectivity, impartiality and non-partisanship, consistent with the joint administration of the Funds.
Hence, there are reasons why the office of the Funds and
the records of the Funds should be a neutral location, that do
not necessarily apply to the meetings of the Trustees.
My feeling therefore is that if either set of Trustees
object to participating in meetings at the locale of the Funds
office, they should not be ordered by an arbitrator to do so.

I

agree with the Employer Trustees that meetings at the Fund office
are more efficient because the records and files are there and
are readily available for use during the meeting.

But convenience

and efficiency are not enough to my mind to force one group of
Trustees to meet at the Fund

office when they do not wish to do

so, and when their work may at times be adversarial and partisan.
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On the other hand, I agree with the Union Trustees that
the locale of the office is in one of the most congested traffic
areas of the City, and that the conference room space in the
office is small and probably tight and uncomfortable for Trustee
meetings. (The overall office, however,, is modern, newly renovated
and quite attractive.)
Under the foregoing circumstances and findings, I think
the alternative possibilities for Trustee meetings as set forth
in the Agreements and Declarations of Trust, should be followed.
Section 11 of the Welfare Trust Agreement and Section 11
of the Pension Trust Agreement both provide, in pertinent part:
"Meetings shall be held at the office of
The Fund...or at the offices of either
the Union or the Southern Association..."
(emphasis added)
Until or unless the Trustees mutually agree otherwise, the
meetings of the Trustees shall be held on an alternating basis
at the offices of the Union and at the offices of the Southern
Association, with the first meeting under this arrangement held
at the offices of the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 3, 1986
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 431, IDE, AFL-CIO
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Waldes Truarc, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the subcontracting of porter or
matron work violates the collective bargaining agreement? If so, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 4, 1986 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The Union and Company filed post-hearing briefs.

The Company subcontracted work previously performed by bargaining unit porters and matrons.

Five porters and one matron

were laid off, and one porter retired.

One in each classifica-

tion was retained.
My view on subcontracting bargaining unit work is, I believe
the majority view of arbitrators.

It is that subcontracting is

barred or restricted under any of the following circumstances.
1.

It is explicitly barred or restricted by
the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.

2.

It is not supported by a bona fide economic
or significant business need.

3.

Its purpose is to damage the bargaining unit
and/or the bargaining agent or was otherwise
in bad faith.

4.

Regardless of its economic or business purpose, its effect is to decimate or substantially cripple the bargaining unit and/or
the bargaining agent.

Irrelevant to this case are such considerations as the
standards of employment of the subcontractor, the questions of
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the special skills and equipment of the subcontractor and the
question of "overflow" of tightly scheduled bargaining unit work
when the bargaining unit is fully occupied.
With regard to the relevant items #1 through #4 above, I
find none present in the instant case to bar the subcontracting.
The contract terms contain no specific bar or limitation
on subcontracting.

I do not infer any such bar or restriction

from the recognition clause, which is of the standard type.

That

clause grants the Union jurisdiction over "production and maintenance employees employed at its plant..." (emphasis added.)
That provision requires the performance of bargaining unit work
by bargaining unit employees when that work is performed by the
Company and its employees.

But it does not reach work which the

Company and its employees do not do, but which is subcontracted.
In short, subcontract work is not work handled by employees "employed" within the meaning of the recognition clause.

This in-

terpretation of the recognition clause is also, I believe, the
majority interpretation and view of arbitrators.
Indeed, the acknowedged past practice of subcontracting
work normally performed in the tool and die shop runs counter to
the Union's interpretation of the recognition clause.

Also, I

think that the Union recognized the faulty nature of its interpretation advanced herein when, many years ago, it sought in
contract negotiations a prohibition on all subcontracting.

While

I agree that at that time the prohibition sought was probably
directed to the tool and die work, the Union's failure to obtain
any specific restriction or prohibition can only be construed now
as meaning that no contract restriction exists with regard to any
bargaining unit work.

Put another way, the failure to prohibit
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or restrict subcontracting of tool and die work can hardly mean
that there was and is some implied prohibition on the subcontracting of other bargaining unit work.

In this area, specificity

is required.
The Company has shown a bona fide economic and business
need.

It has suffered significant business losses (lately in

excess of one million dollars a year, a figure unrefuted by the
Union).

Subcontracting the porter and matron work will save

$90,000 a year.
the work.

Also, it has shown a change in the nature of

The Company has a new single level plant.

its plant was multi-level.

Before,

The new plant layout has simplified

the cleaning requirements and fewer cleaning personnel are needed.
This fact stands unrefuted in the record.
There is no evidence that the subcontracting was intended
to damage the bargaining unit or the bargaining agent.

Nor can

I conclude that it was of a magnitude that crippled or decimated
the unit.

Nor do I find bad faith.

Before subcontracting the work, the Company informed the
Union of its economic difficulties; indicated its intention to
subcontract work; and asked for any ideas on how costs could be
cut.

This approach, was unavailing.
I am persuaded that the subcontracting was done to save

money in the face of large losses and because of a reduced need
for cleaning personnel. The layoff of six employees, while not insignificant, was only a small percentage of the total unionized
work force (approximately 3%).

The porter and matron work was

not totally removed from the unit; two employees with those titles
remained.

Therefore I cannot conclude that the layoffs, under

the particular circumstances involved "crippled or decimated"
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the bargaining unit within the meaning of item #4 above.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The subcontracting of porter or matron work
did not violate the collective bargaining
agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 8, 1986
STATE OF New York ) gs
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 365, Cemetary Workers
and Greens Attendants Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0508 86

and
Woodlawn Cemetary

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate the contract
when it did not pay a full tour of
eight hours to the following named employees for less than eight hours work
on Saturday February 8, 1986?
Brian Maffucci
Steve Vizard
Robert Rozek
Joe D'Arrigo
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 30, 1986 at which time the
above-named

employees and representatives of the above-named

and Employer appeared.

Union

All concerned were afforded full opportun-

ity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.
It is stipulated that the above-named employees hereinafter
referred to as the "grievants" worked less than eight hours removing snow on Saturday February 8, 1986, and were paid for seven and
one-half hours at the overtime rate.
The Union contends that by the wording of Article XII, Section A of the contract, and by past practice, there is a guarantee
of eight hours pay at the overtime rate, if any employee is required to work on a Saturday, even if the work he performs is less than
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eight hours in duration.
The Union has not proved its case, either under the contract language or by a binding past practice.
Article XII, Section A reads:
SATURDAY AND SUNDAY WORK
A.
Any work which an employee is required to
perform by the Employer on Saturday shall be
paid for at the rate of time and one-half the
employee's regular hourly rate of pay. Work
beyond eight hours on Saturday shall be paid at
double time the employee's regular hourly rate
of pay. Any work which an employee is required
to perform by the Employer on Sunday shall be
paid at the rate of double time the employee's
regular hourly rate of pay. Work beyond eight
hours on Sunday shall be paid at double time and
a half the employee's regular hourly rate of pay.
That clause does not contain any express language supporting the Union's claim of an eight hour guarantee.

In my view and

in my experience, such a guarantee is of sufficient importance and
consequence as to warrant specific contract language that provides
that benefit.
are regularly

Such guarantees, which exceed the actual time worked
found in

the specific language of collective bar-

gaining agreements, if that benefit is accorded.
I do not think that any such guarantee should be implied,
where, as here the bare contract language does not lend itself to
that implication.
otherwise.

Indeed, the wording of Article XII suggests

It provides for payment on Saturdays for "any work

which an employee is required to perform by the Employer" (emphasis
added).

A fair reading and interpretation of that language would

mean that the pay shall equal the amount of time worked.

In any

event, in the face of that limiting language, I fail to see how
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an eight hour guarantee, or in other words pay for time not worked
or not required can be logically inferred or imputed.
If the contract language is deemed clear with regard to
limiting Saturday pay to the actual hours worked, any past practice
to the contrary would be immaterial.
It is not unreasonable however, to construe Article XII
Section A as ambiguous.

The Union argues that the second sentence

which provides for double time pay for work "beyond eight hours"
means that there is a minimum eight hour guarantee at time and one
half.

If the ambiguity is accepted as reasonable, then the past

practice under the clause would be relevant to its meaning and
interpretation.
However, to be probative, a past practice must be of significant duration, unvaried and specifically delineated as to facts
and circumstances.

The evidence of past practice offered by the

Union does not meet this test.
The few instances referred to were not adequately particularized as to time or circumstance.

It was not established that

employees were actually paid for a full tour when they worked less.
In one instance the employees were "on the clock" for the eight
hours, though the first hour was apparently spent seeking the final
member of the snow removal crew.

That the Employer paid for that

first hour was logical and proper and is not evidence of payment
for time not worked.

There is no evidence that the crew member who

started later received pay for the full tour.
In another instance an employee was offered eight hours if
he would come in on an emergency basis.
ed as an

Obviously this was design-

inducement to get the employee to work, when the Employer

-4had not scheduled him for Saturday work the preceding day.
mind this is evidence of a lack of a guarantee.

To my

If eight hours is

guaranteed it did not have to be offered as an inducement. Also,
I reject this as "a practice" because the employee involved turned
the offer down.
That the Employer may have provided eight hours of work on
a Saturday, and where the employees worked those eight hours, is
not evidence of a guarantee of eight hours for less time worked.
This is so, even if a part of the eight hours worked is "makework."

It is work nonetheless

within the meaning of Article XII

Section A, and does not involve pay for work not performed.
The only possible example of payment for eight hours on
Saturday for less time worked, was the testimony regarding the
crematory operator.

However, setting aside the fact that the oper-

ator did not testify and the facts of his Saturday work were allegations by other employees, a single instance of this type does
not make a "past practice."
Finally, the Union's testimony regarding the negotiation
history of Article XII was unclear and indeterminative.

The testi-

mony regarding a call-in guarantee for grave diggers when vault
operators handled interments

in the vault established an arrange-

ment limited to that particular circumstance, and there is no evidence that it is applicable to the snow removal crew working on a
Saturday.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the contract
when it did not pay a full tour of eight
hours for less than eight hours work on
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Saturday February 8, 1986. The grievance
of Brian Maffucci, Steve Vizard, Robert
Rozek and Joe D'Arrigo are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 8, 1986
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 450

I.U.E.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0687 86

and
Zenith Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated the labor agreement between the parties by failing to recall
a laid-off employee and if so, what the remedy
should be?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on October 9, 1986 at which time representatives
of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine

witnesses.

In December 1985 Joanne Watson, a Counter Clerk/Order Clerk
suffered an injury on the job, and thereafter went on disability.
It was anticipated that she would be off the job for two to three
weeks.

By agreement between a Company representative (Mr. S.

Goldman) and a new Union Shop Chairman (Mrs. K. Murphy), Murphy
was to call employees on lay-offand offer them the employment
opportunity created by Watson's disability.
I accept Murphy's testimony that he told most of the laid-off
employees he called that the vacancy was "temporary" until Watson
returned.

To some he said that it was "temporary", but "could be-

come permanent if Watson did not return."

Murphy called all ten

employees on the relevant lay-off list in seniority order.

All

rejected the offer except the tenth, Jim Zuchnieovich, who had the
least seniority.
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I find that the other nine rejected the offer, primarily
at least, because they were told or otherwise believed that the
job was temporary; that Watson would return within a few weeks;
and that to accept a return to active employment for such a short
period of time would be disruptive to their unemployment insurance
entitlement.
As it turned out, Watson did not return to work until March
17, 1986.

Within ten days after she returned to work, another

employee in the Department, A. Mould, a Shipping and Receiving
Clerk, retired.

The Company then made the following assignments

in the Department.

Zuchnieovich who had filled the Watson vacancy

as a Counter and Order Clerk while Watson was out, moved to the
job of Shipping and Receiving Clerk which was vacated by the Mould
retirement, and Watson resumed her original job as a Counter and
Order Clerk.

It is stipulated that the jobs of Counter and Order

Clerk and Shipping and Receiving Clerk are interchangeable in terms'
of qualifications.
The Union contends that when Mould retired, his job should
not have been filled by Zuchnieovich, but offered to the employees
on lay-off originally canvassed for the Watson vacancy.

Specific-

ally the Union claims that the Mould vacancy should have been offer
ed to David Diaz, the employee on lay-off with the greatest seniority, and that to retain Zuchnieovich, the least senior employee in
the original lay-off group, was in violation of Article XI Section
3 of the contract which reads:
"Regular employees shall be recalled from lay
off in seniority order in their department,
provided such employees have the skill and
ability to perform the available work."
There is no dispute that Diaz had the ability and skill to
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perform the work previously performed by Mould.
It is the Company's position that Diaz and the others who
remained involuntarily laid-off had waived and extinguished their
rights to be recalled when they declined to return to work to fill
the Watson vacany.

The Company argures that there is no contract-

ual recognition of a

difference between a "temporary" vacancy or

a permanent vacancy.

All vacancies are covered by the recall pro-

visions of the contract and that an employee on layoff shall lose
his seniority rights under the provisions of Article X Section 3,
paragraph (f) of the contract, if he:
"fails to report for work within a seventytwo (72) hour period after receipt of notice
of recall; such notice of recall shall consist of a telgraphic or registered mail notice
to the employee's last known address as registered by the employee with the Company, or by
such other means as agreed upon by the Company
and the Union."
It is not disputed that the arrangement to have Murphy call
the employees on layoff constituted "other means as agreed upon
by the Company and the Union" within the meaning of the foregoing
clause.
I accept the Company's additional assertion that it did not
tell or authorize Murphy to inform the employees canvassed that the
Watson vacancy was "temporary" or that the "recall would be only
for the period of her disability."

I find that he so informed the)

canvassed employees on his own, but that this was a factual and
logical interpretation of the circumstances of the recall offer,
inasm

h as an employee on disability has a right to reclaim his or

her job when the disability ends.
The issue therefore narrows to whether the relevant group of
laid-off employees had lost their right to claim the job from whict
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Mould retired, because of their previous refusal to accept
call to the Watson vacancy.

re-

And whether, by transferring

Zuchnieovich to the work previously performed by Mould when Watson
returned, the Company is correct in its assertion that "the only
vacancy involved" was the original Watson opening while she was on
disability.
Based on past practice and fundamental contract interpretation, I find the Company's position to be unpersuasive.

The Company

argues that it "decides when a vacancy exists" and that in the instant case, the "only vacancy declared and recognized" was when
Watson left on disability.

Obviously vacancies may occur and exist

without being so identified and recognized by the Company.

When

an employee on active duty leaves a job classification and where
and when his or her duties are still to be performed and the job
classification is taken over by someone else, there has been a
vacancy and that vacancy has been filled, whether the Company
officially recognizes it is such or not.

A mere transfer of an

employee from one classification (Counter and Order Clerk) to the
classification (Shipping and Receiving Clerk) cannot camouflage
the fact that a vacancy existed in the former job and was filled
by a transfer from the latter.

And the Company cannot escape the

fact of such a vacancy nor effectively deny it, by asserting a
managerial right to decide when and if a vacancy occurs.

If the

Company's assertion in this case is that it has the managerial right
to leave a vacant job vacant; or to discontinue the work previously
performed by an employee when he leaves, and thereby not fill the
vacated classification, it is correct.
ed here.

But that is notwhat happen^

The Mould job was not left vacant and its job duties were

not discontinued.

Instead, Zuchnieovich was placed in the position,
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by transfer, and he picked up the job duties of Shipping and Receiving Clerk previously performed by Mould.
I find therefore that when Mould retired, a vacancy in the
job Shipping and Receiving Clerk occurred.

That vacancy should

have been filled in accordance with Article XI Section 3 of the
contract, by the recall of a qualified employee on layoff.
Zuchnieovich had no pre-eminent right to that job; his employment
rights were circumscribed by the period of Watson's disability and
her rightful return to her job upon her return from disability.
The critical question is whether the employees on layoff,
who had rejected the recall offer to the Watson vacancy lost their
recall rights under Article X Section 3(f) of the contract.
Based on evidence in the record of a practice in recall situations of distinguishing between a recall notice for a "temporary"
job assignment and a regular or indeterminate job assignment, I
find that the bare language of Article X Section 3(f) is ambiguous
as to meaning.

It is unclear whether the seventy-two hour recall

limit applies to regular, permanent jobs or jobs of an indeterminate length of time only or also covers work of a short-term or
temporary in nature.
The probative evidence on past practice persuades me that
Article X Section 3(f) has been applied to the former but not the
latter, and that employees who rejected recall for short term or
temporary work did not lose their seniority for later recall.

And

that in the instant situation the laid-off employees believed and
had reasonable grounds to believe that their rejection of a short
term or temporary job opening, would not prejudice, or extinguish
their seniority rights under Article XI Section 3 of the contract.
With the foregoing finding, it follows that the Company
erred in not offering the vacancy in the job Shipping and Receiving
Clerk created by the Mould retirement
who had rejected the Watson vacancy.

to those employees on layof:
As Diaz testified that he

-6-

would have accepted that recall, and as he was the senior employee
on the layoff list and the one who grieved, he should have been
recalled, and is the employee entitled to a remedy for the Company's
contract breach consistent with Article XIV Section 5 of the contract .
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named

parties, makes the following AWARD:

The Company violated the labor agreement between the parties by failing to recall David
Diaz. rir.
jjiaz.
Mr. uia/i
Diaz snail
shall be
ue recalled
recalled to
LU the
LUK juu
job
Shipping and Receiving Clerk and shall be paid
for back wages lost due to the Company's failure
to recall him in accordance with the provisions
and limitations of Article XIV Section 5 of the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 3, 1986
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

